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ABSTRACT
This study aimed to highlight factors used by the Belgian authorities to divide Rwandans
during the Colonial Reform Process between 1926 and 1931. More specially, it is aimed at
identifying how they mobilised Hutu, Tutsi and Twa social classes and transformed the
ethnic identities.
To achieve this goal, unsh"uctured interviews and a questionnaire were used. In addition,
several data analyses were also used to measure and decipher the attitudes of both the
interview and survey's respondents.
The results indicated the conflict started when the Belgian colonisers implemented indirect
rules that highlighted a selected elite from the Tutsi Tribe. This group benefited from social
and economic advantages which totally excluded the Hutu and Twa tribes. With the refoll11,
the previous traditional structure was destroyed, and with the new administration only Tutsi
chiefs remained whereas Hutu and Twa chiefs were rendered obsolete. Tutsi were seen as
bom chiefs. On the contrary, they judged the Hutu good for manual work and exploited them
as a labour force.
For a deep acceptance of this new order, colonisers reinforced ethnic policies with
ideological assumptions which defined Tutsi as the superior race. In this regard, several
ethnologists and anthropologists attempted to prove the Hamitic origin of the Tutsi, allowing
Belgians to use the "Hamitic Myth", which assumed that the Tutsi was the only group able to
understand development and to command at the request of the colonial state. In addition,
Belgians decided to issue identity cards which clearly stated the bearer's tribal origin. This
undoubtedly influenced people to develop ethnic feelings and disposed the most fiercely
rival groups (Hutu and Tutsi) to ethnic competition that led to outbreaks of violence in 1959
when Belgians shifted their allegiance from Tutsi to Hutu as the fom1er was asking for
independence.
The scarcity of environmental resources increased the desire to monopolise control of the
country as this was continually perceived as only means of access to resources. This led
Rwandan politicians to use ethnicity as a way to secure power. Consequently, a culture of
ethnic violence became entrenched. This culminated in genocide from April to July 1994.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION: PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PURPOSE OF
THE STUDY
1.1. INTRODUCTION
Among several aspects of human life, identity qualifies as primary. In this regard, the issue
of identity has a profound influence on global politics and affects relationships between
individuals, groups and states. Many conflicts involve identities because interests are often
negotiable through identities. Lauren (1988: 3) argues that in their attempts to maintain or
increase power, prestige, or wealth groups find it easy to invest in or accept the idea that
others are somehow different from them. Several identities can be instrumental in
discrimination but ethnic identity offers the facility that increases one's consciousness of
belonging or being a member of a certain group. In Rwanda, the concept of ethnic identity
requires a careful examination in order to understand how it contributed to the most violent
ethnic conflict by the end of 20th Century.
1.2. PROBLEM STATEME T
Recent research on the Rwandan conflict has focused mainly on the genocide of Tutsi as
an unimaginable outcome of several decades of intensive etlmic mobilisation. This reaction
is understandable if one considers that genocide encompasses the systematic and physical
elimination of an identified ethnic group. As defined by the United Nation Convention,
December 9, 1948 (quoted in Staub, 2000: 339), Genocide consists of "acts committed
with intent to destroy in whole or in paIi, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group"
One particular feature which still attracts curiosity in the Rwandan genocide is that in a
mere three months, the killers am1ed only with machetes succeeded in executing
approximately one million people. This unique case where killings were very fast made the
Rwandan genocide the first one in which civilians participated in massacres against other
civilians. Furthem10re, it singularly proves how the manipulation of ethnic identities
worked more successfully in Rwanda than it had anywhere else.
Before 1994 there had been outbreaks of violence in 1959, 1963, and 1973 but at no time
did it reach the proportion of the mass killing of 1994. The violence was ethnically
motivated but was not officially organised. The Rwandan people are made up of three
ethnic groups: the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The Twa tribe represents only 1% of the
population and was never part of Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy. For this reason, the Twa are often
omitted from accounts of the Rwandan conflict.
However, one must take into account that violent conflict involving ethnic identities did
not occur before the Belgian colonization of Rwanda. In this regard, oral traditions and
several researches testify to stable traditional institutions with cultural, political and
religious unity. Many historical arguments conclude that the Tutsi were not necessarily
dominant, nor were the Hutu their subjects.
Socially, Rwandans were grouped into three social classes corresponding to Tutsi, Hutu
and Twa. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were not ethnic identities but social classes. According to
Duly (2000) the tem1S Hutu and Tutsi were largely constmcted as social categories
representing different socio-economic positions within Rwandan society rather than as
objective biological or cultural differences. Pamphile (2000:86) emphasizes that before
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colonization the Hutu tended to be farmers, the Tutsi were stockbreeders and the Twa were
hunters or potters. But given the complex ancestral history, these were by no means
exclusive categories.
It has been proved that all human beings recogmse and usually live up to the moral
obligations of the people with whom they identify (Shibuthani and Kwan, 1965: 57). The
above researchers stress that ethnic groups do not always differ significantly, but they
differ to the extent that the members define situations differently and behave differently.
Ethnic groups do not always differ in this respect, but when they do, the differences that
are impoltant are cultural.
As testified by oral traditions, a number of myths have circulated for many years
purpolting to explain the genetic roots of the Rwandans. Whilst these legends may help to
explain certain aspects of the genesis of the long stability of the Rwandan people before
the colonisation, evidently Hutu and Tutsi continue to share culture, the language known as
"Kinyarwanda", customs and traditional religions. Another particular fact that merits
attention is the powerful role that clans play in kinship. The clan allowed diversity within
Rwandans in the pre-colonial period; Newbury argues that all clans contained Hutu, Tutsi
and even Twa members. The clan identified each individual Rwandan with words such as
"umuzigaba", "ul11ukono" and "umwega"l. In areas where the terms Hutu and Tutsi were
in common use, their meaning tended to indicate status, wealth, or region, and not ethnicity
(1978:26).
I These are examples of names of clans in Rwanda.
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Rwanda was politically divided into self-directed mini-monarchies, and either a Tutsi with
both Hutu and Tutsi subjects or a Hutu with members of both tribes could rule any given
kingdom. Amongst them was the kingdom ruled by the clan of Nyiginya, which became
powerful and with the assistance of the Europeans, conquered the rest of monarchies in the
last half of 19th Century. Duly emphasizes that before colonialism, Rwanda was a region
that, although not without problems, had a healthy degree of social hamlony and cultural
cohesion between the members of the tribal groups (Duly, 2000).
The anival and active involvement of Europeans in Rwandan political affairs during the
colonial rule resulted in profound changes that destroyed the previous traditional socio-
economic institutions. The colonization of Rwanda is divided in two phases: the first lead
by the Gemlans and the second by the Belgians. By 1897, Gemlany had established a
colonial system, and with the strategy of indirect rule they decided to reinforce the Tutsi
monarchy intending to control Rwanda through selected Tutsi elite. The end of the Gemlan
colonial rule in Rwanda coincided with their defeat at the World War I in ] 916. Even
though the presence of Gennans in Rwanda was relatively short, it left a negative mark on
previous diversity.
As outlined above, the Gennans contributed to creating a centralised Tutsi monarchy in
extending the control of Nyiginya dynasty over the rest of mini-monarchies, particularly
those located in North. The mini-monarchies in the north had mainly been ruled by Hutu.
By ignoring and, finally annihilating Hutu mini-monarchies, the Gemlans initiated a
structure of conflict that continued to be reinforced by the Belgians in later years.
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Since their arrival in Rwanda in 1926, the Belgians set up a system that involved colonial
administrators, Europeans anthropologists and the Catholic Church who were all
committed to proving the superiority of the Tutsi and to prepare Tutsi elite, which could
act as administration auxiliaries. The following statement by the Bishop Class cited by
Duly (2000) highlights the above view: " ... the Tutsi are the best suited to understand
progress and the ones the population likes best. The government must work mainly with
them". Then the myth of Tutsi superiority became a leading idea particularly during the
Colonial Reforn1 of Administration. Their rise in status was accompanied by better
educational and employment opportunities, a process which began in 1926 and ended in
1931. As Newbury explains the new chiefs were almost invariably of Tutsi status, Hutu in
turn came to be associated with and eventually defined by an inferior status ( ewbury,
1978:21).
In summary, the colonial reform constituted a crucial shift that established the ethnic
cleavage. At the end of this Colonial Reforn1 of Administration the new Tutsi elite and
even poor Tutsi adopted attitudes of superiority towards their Hutu neighbours. On the
other hand, the Hutu, confronted with the new reality of discrimination, developed feelings
of inferiority and became increasingly discontented.
The Belgians institutionalised the politics of the manipulation of ethnic identities when
they distributed identity cards which indicated whether the holder was Tutsi, Hutu or Twa.
The perception of ethnic identity became hierarchical with Tutsi on the top, followed by
Hutu and finally Twa. This seed of ethnicity continued to be propagated among Rwandans
culminating in several killings and the 1994 genocide. What is clear is that people have
used the differences built up under colonial rule to make Rwandans confront one another.
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1.3. GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE STUDY: MAIN RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The implementation by the colonial state of indirect rule in Rwanda implied a new political
and economic structure which lead to great changes (Staub, 1998) that affected the
previous traditional order, in particular Hutu and Tutsi relations. Therefore, this study will
focus on ethnic identities as the means used to manipulate and mobilise Tutsi and Hutu in
order to establish the colonial rule during the Colonial Refom1 of Administration
conducted from 1926 to 1931 and its consequences.
The main research questions are:
• To what extent are ethnic identities socially constructed?
• What was the nature of ethnic identities before the Belgian colonial refoTIn (1926-
1931) in Rwanda?
• What policies or strategies did the Belgians use to institutionalise fixed ethnic
identities and to build rigid boundaries?
• What were the consequences during the refom1 process and late, and what has been
the implication for the present?
1.4. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
As the study assumes that the manipulation of ethnic identities during the Belgian colonial
refoTIn constitute the root cause of the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda the,
specific objectives of this study are:
• To identifY social, economIC and political actions taken· during the colonial
refom1, that mobilised Tutsi and Hutu social statuses, raising a new
consciousness of their ethnic origin;
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• To assess the sense of survival developed by each group from their new fixed
ethnic positions after the systematic elimination of the traditional structure that
allowed social mobility;
• To examme stereotypes, myths and ideological discourses developed by
colonialists that entrenched the boundaries between Hutu and Tutsi and that
continue to maintain suspicion and discrimination;
• To assess how the control of power became the only means of access to
resources and how this led to violent ethnic competition; and
• To find solutions
1.5. DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study is undeniably a historical contextualization of root-causes of the conflict
between the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. Subsequently, the researcher will focus mainly on
the period of Belgian colonial refom1s (1926 to 1931).
1.6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The chapter on methodology will encompass the methods of investigation used in this
study. The research design, population, sample, research instruments and data collection




The study used qualitative and quantitative methods due to the nature of the topic. The
hybrid method was used in this study as a response to some methodological limitations
imposed by the nature of the sensitive topic and the high degree of ethnic prejudice in
Rwanda and subsequent attitudes. If properly executed, a combination of qualitative and
quantitative was judged better for this study. In this regard, Ouho (2002: 6) states that
when research is riddled with prejudice, biased measurements and interpretations are likely
to produce spurious results. The researcher should therefore collect quantitative and
qualitative data, which should be subjected to more rigorous analytical techniques than
intuitive interpretations. As Ouho highlight, the latter is inevitable where data does not
allow for statistical analysis (Ouho, 2002:7). However, carefully selected qualitative
techniques can promote useful insights into issues that require interpretations of broad
perspectives rather than accurate measurements. The qualitative approach was the leading
approach in this study as the subjective perceptions of Hutu and Tutsi about the impact of
the Colonial Refom1 of Administration on ethnic relations in Rwanda was thoroughly
investigated. As de Vos and Romanucci-Ross emphasise, methodologically, ethnic identity
is best studied through an analysis of the subjective meaning of behaviour in an
interactional social context (1982:4).
1.6.2. Population sample and sampling
The non-probability sample was selected because it produces acceptable results, which are
less expensive in terms of means and time. Cooper and Schindler (2001:121) assume that
this approach may present evidence that is overwhelming and that a more sophisticated
sampling procedure is unnecessary. One of its major advantages is the restriction of
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intuition and subjectivity when the researcher operates within the same overall cultural
framework as his or her respondents.
The target population was all Rwandans living in Kigali City and Kigali rural province. A
survey was administered to 145 respondents of which 120 completed the survey. This
signifies an acceptance response rate of 85 per cent.
Black (1999) assumes that most populations can be segregated into several mutually
exclusive subpopulations or strata. The sample population consisted of both genders, their
ages varied between 20-60 years for the categOly of young respondents, and 61-100 years
for the category of old respondents. The level of education was two categories: uneducated
respondents comprised levels of illiterate, primary school and under secondary school; and
educated respondents comprised levels of secondary school, under-graduate, and post-
graduate. As outlined above, the location of the respondents were both urban and rural.
A convenient method was employed and as Black argues, convenience sampling represents
an unrestricted type of non-probability sampling method. The te1111 convenience applies
that researchers have the freedom to choose what suits the convenience of the study; cheap
and easy to conduct, with the convenience sampling there is no need for a list of the
population (Black, 1999).
1.6.3. Research instruments
The info1111ation was primaly 111 nature and was collected from vanous sources, Vla
unstructured interview and questionnaire. Complementary information was collected
through observation by the researcher during the period June- July 2003. The literature
source that has been used was secondary.
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1.6.4. Methods of data collection
1.6.4.1. Interview
The infonnal conversational interview was judged appropriate for this study. As argued by
Patton (1990:343) the strength of this method resides in the opportunities it offers for
flexibility, spontaneity, and responsiveness to individual differences and situational
changes. It provides useful insights into issues and where more rigid methods do not
pem1it accurate measurement. Questions can be personalised to deepen communication
with the interviewee and to make use of the immediate surroundings and situations to
increase the concreteness and immediacy of the interview questions.
1.6.4.2. Questionnaire
When the questionnaire was ready to be administered, two assistants were employed in the
administering of the questionnaire given the extreme difficulties of reaching the required
audience. Fifty-six respondents out of a total of 120 who accepted to respond the
questionnaire were old people. This category was important as they had witnessed the
Belgian colonisation. The old category of respondents allowed the study to assess the
problem of mobilization of ethnic identities from its starting point. The young category
infOlmed the researcher about its impact on subsequent generations. This guided the
researcher to explore all factors that raised ethnic awareness as a result of the manipulation
of ethnic identities during the Colonial Reform of Administration process. Gender, level of
education and location will allow the researcher to measure meanings of ethnic beliefs and
opinions and to assess how the categories of respondents are affected differently by
ethnicity in accordance with the above variants. The questionnaire had two parts, the first
part was about the identity of respondent; the second part contained questions related to the
case study (see Appendices 1). Respondents were requested to complete the questionnaire.
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The questionnaire took a maximum of 10 minutes to complete, and the interview took a
maximum of 40 minutes.
1.6.4.3. Participant observation
By means of participant observation, the researcher come closest to understanding what the
respondents were expressing verbally and how they acted with reference to one another.
The researcher had a period of observation during the two last weeks of June and the whole
month of July 2003 which was the period of presidential and parliamentary elections in
Rwanda. This time period was of crucial importance for this study, i11ustrating how some
candidates attempted to mobilise ethnicity in a very closely-contested competition for
power. The research tried to observe how people from the two groups reacted and behaved
during that period of competition.
1.6.5. Methods of data analysis
Data from interviews were analysed manually. As argued, one of the instruments of
collecting data was an unrestricted type of non-probability sampling. This implied the
analysis of findings by descriptive statistics. Findings were presented in frequencies
distributions in tables. According to Black (1999), descriptive statistics do not imply the
use of correlation coefficient measure; rather it allows clear observation of frequencies and
percentages of respondents' infOlmation.
1.6.6. Reliability and validity
Reliability is a matter of whether a particular technique, applied repeatedly to the same
object, would yield the same result each time (Babie and Mouton, 2002).
I 1
Validity is concemed with whether the findings are really about what they appear to be
about. In conventional usage, the term validity refers to the extent to which an empirical
measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration (Babie
and Mouton, 2002).
Generalisability is a concem that researchers may have about the design of their studies
insofar as their study results are generalisable; that is, whether their findings may be
equally applicable to other research settings. Consequently, the questionnaire and the
unstructured interview that was used in this study provided both reliable and valid results,
which are similar to other studies: Newbury (1978, 1988), OPRR (1996), Linden and
Linden (1977), Des Forges (1995), Staub (1989).
1.6.7 Limitations
On a general level, respondents were reluctant to participate in the survey. The reason is
probably the study itself, which relates to ethnic identities in Rwanda. Some of them were
openly hostile to hearing the words "ethnic issue". This reaction is understandable if one
considers that the genocide took place in Rwanda only nine years ego. Suspicion and fear
persist, particularly in this period of Gacaca I and people are really sensitive about their
ethnicity.
Another limitation included the financial difficulty 111 access111g large numbers of
respondents from the various provinces in Rwanda.
I In Rwandanlanguage Gacaca means 'Justice on the grass': ajuridical process in which the Rwandan public
tries and judges those who wish to confess or have been accused of genocide crimes. In the pre-colonial era,
Gacaca was a popular indigenous form for resolving local disputes over family matters, property rights and
other concerns. The Rwandan government officially launched the present-day Gacaca court system on 18 June
2002 in response to the overwhelming number of prisoners whose cases remain untried since the genocide.
Estimates suggest that prior to January 2003 between 100.000 and 125.000 Rwandans awaited trial in
overcrowded prisons (Corey and Joireman, 2004: 81-82)
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Another limitation encountered was the problem that research is underdeveloped in
Rwanda. There is particularly a shortage of studies of social identities. As a consequence,
this has been a limitation of this study in tem1S of empirical references.
1.7. OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION
The dissertation is a study of the mobilization of ethnic identities of the Hutu and Tutsi in
order to establish the colonial rule during the reform process from 1926 to 1931 and its
consequences.
In this Chapter the problem statement, main questions of the study, specific objectives, and
delimitations, methodology of collecting data and data analysis; and limitations have been
presented. The rest of the dissertation is organised as follows:
Chapter Two offers a theoretical framework that explains the concept of ethnic identity. It
examines general aspects which define ethnic identity and assesses the concept as a
potential source of conflict.
Chapter Three exammes the nature of ethnic identities m Rwanda before the Belgian
colonial administrative reforms of 1926 to 1931.
Chapter Four presents the research results based on the questionnaires and interviews. The
discussion of the results attempts to gauge the role of Belgian colonial ref0TI11S in the
manipulation and mobilization of ethnic identities that culminated in violence in
subsequent years.
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Chapter Five provides the mam conclusions of this study and suggests some
recommendations for future studies and for peacemaking policies in Rwanda.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE CONCEPT OF ETHNIC IDENTTY AND CONFLICT
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Social identities are connected to each aspect of a person's life and ethnic identity is the
most dynamic and the most evident social identity concept. In consequence, it is necessary
to gain an unambiguous meaning of ethnic identity as social identity. The common sense
of the concept of identity is an individual's understanding of who he is and of who other
people are. Jenkins states that human social life is unimaginable without some means of
knowing who others are and some sense of which we are (1996:5).
When encountering a stranger, the first step is to try to locate him on one's own very broad
social map of various categories of identities. Each individual incorporates different
identities, and as a result, has different perspectives of life and problems. Identity is a very
influential and active concept in the mind - whether consciously or unconsciously. Some
identities are more valuable than others but ethnic identity is one of the most influential
identities.
2.2. ETHNIC IDENTITY AS SOCIAL IDENTITY
2.2.1. What is social identity?
Fisher et al argue that each person is born either male or female or born into a particular
way of life. For example, a bushman from the Kalahari and an urban citizen of
Johannesburg have different experiences of life. Each person has his or her own values and
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thinking, which guide his behaviour. These values and thinking are inforn1ed by the
different identities the person holds (Fisher et ai, 2000: 47)
Appiah (1994: 150) states that the concept of 'social identity' evokes what is called
collective descriptions such as religion, gender, ethnicity, race and sexuality. Social
identity is never a final or settled matter and can be understood as consciousness, process
and recognition. Identity is a necessary prerequisite for social life; consequently people
form individual and collective consciousness of it from an early age. One learns to feel and
behave as prescribed by ones culture and collective consciousness (Jenkins, 1996:4).
For example, a systematic set of beliefs, ideas, knowledge and practices differentiate Zulu
from Tutsi ethnic groups and Catholics from Muslins. The awareness of social identity is
progressively forn1ed and shaped through various forms of social interactions, cultural
symbols and codes. Ericksen (2002: 13) argues that there is a systematic establishment of
significations between an individual and the collectivity through relationships of
similarities and differences.
The concept of identity is constituted by 'similarity' and 'difference' as two elements
internally and inflexibly linked. According to Jenkins 'similarity' and 'difference' are "the
dynamic principles of identity, the heart of social life, the practical significance of men for
one another in the most varied forn1s; both are the great principles of all internal and
external development" (1996: 6). In the light of above, each principle makes possible
another, for example Kikongo as the common language of the Bakongo is an important
factor of similarity among them but also the same language signifies the difference
between them and non - speakers of Kikongo. The above aspects of social identity are a
convenient way of daily interactions, so that the whole social organization is very
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concerned with this. Social identities are in themselves one foundation upon which order
and predictability in the social world are based.
2. 2.2. How is social identity acquired?
Several researchers indicate that social identity is acquired. It has its roots in one's earliest
process of socialisation. According to Hayes (1991), a human being cannot exist alone.
The bi11h of children initiates human beings into a life-long process of mutual adaptation.
The interaction with other children, the intimate relationship found in families and the
broader social environment shape individuals identities. Ethnic identity dominates this
development because it is a cultural element.
With more clarity Mc Adams, quoted in Hayes (1991), argues that emotionality, activity,
impulsivity and sociability are the four basic temperament dimensions present in human
beings. Sociability is presented as the most important, and defined as the tendency to be
outgoing and friendly and to enjoy the company of others. This dimension is present in
infancy and childhood continuing to grow throughout adulthood. As a consequence, social
life is a necessary prerequisite for identity and during social interactions people prefer to
seek out those who hold the same culture or ethnic identity as themselves. In this
connection, Jenkins (1996:20) emphasizes the idea that identity is not meaningful in
isolation from the social world of other people. Interactions and relationships fomled
throughout a lifetime shape individual traits.
However, interactions between individuals and society raise the question of authenticity of
the individual personality. This authenticity requires one to reject much that is
conventional in society. (Appiah, 1994: 154)
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A French philosopher, Jean Paul Sartre in his roman "La Nausee" supports the above idea
arguing for absolute freedom for every human being to choose the way of his life. To be
realistic there are not many options: individuals fom1 their 'selves' from a tool kit of
options made available by their culture and society (http//www.com/priate/philosophers).
In some way this position is in accordance with French author Jean Jacques Rousseau.
Analysing social influences in his study 'Emile' thinks that the nature of each human being
is initially good but progressively cOffilpted by society during the process of socialization
(http://www.russian-mafia.de/untermen ues/Fun/Zi late/jean iaq ues%20 Rousseau.htlll I).
However, an autonomous 'self or a built 'true self personality seems to not be achievable.
As Billington, Hockey and Strawbridge (1998: 40) point out, it supposes two distinct
entities: 'Self and 'Society', which are often opposed, with the latter imposing constraints.
It is human nature to want to break out and 'do our own thing'. As argued above, the true
self or the uniqueness is not possible. From infancy, parents and society are seen as
limiting the core self from the outside. Furthem10re, in the adulthood there is often a need
to see one's identity confinned and recognised by others in one's society.
It may be debated whether individuals are merely empty recipients of a complex interplay
of social forces such as family, ethnic background, religion, education institutions and peer
groups. Billington, Hockey and Strawbridge emphasize that as an awareness grows of how
one's personal and social histories shape one's lives, creative potential can be released to
fashion one's roles and relationships and to struggle against the socially structured
relationships of power that constrain and oppress (1998: 56). The struggle to recognise and
celebrate difference is a key issue in the politics of identity. This issue is fundamental for
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many ethnic groups such as Albanians of Macedonia, ethnic groups in South of Sudan and
the Banyamulenge in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
2. 2.3. Individual, personal and collective identities
According to Appiah (1994: 151) each person's individual identity is seen has two major
dimensions. There is a collective dimension, the intersection of their collective identities,
and there is a personal dimension, consisting of other socially or morally important
features such as intelligence, chann, wit and cupidity. These features are not themselves
the basis of fOlms of collective identity because researchers admit that social identities of
intelligent or honest people do not exist (Jenkins, 1996: 4)
We understand this distinction through following example. "My name is'S', a Rwandan. I
am honest, intelligent and likable". In this case, the person's individual identity is his
name, and the fact that he sees himself as an honest man, Rwandan, intelligent and likable.
The collective dimension of his individual identity is that like him there are many other
Rwandans with whom he shares many features, which characterise each Rwandan such as
language, culture and traditions.
This notion suggests in addition, that there is a distinction between a person's 'nominal
identities' and their 'virtual identity'. The fom1er is the name, and the latter the experience
of an identity, or what it means to bear it. It is possible for individuals to share the same
nominal identity, but in practice this may mean different things to different people
(Jenkins, 1996: 24). For example, the French tem1 "depute" means to be Member of
Parliament but in the popular language in Rwanda, pregnant women are also called
'depute'.
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On the issue of personal identity, Billington, Hockey and Strawbridge present another
explanation, which refers to the individual's sense of who he is:
We lean towards the view that not only is our experience of who we are deeply
affected by culture but so also are theories about the nature of the "self'. The
connection between the English sense of self and the house illustrates the above
notion. The private house can in some ways be seen as symbolising the private
self. It is a container with clear boundaries, which shut out the public world. Home
ownership is not just for the rich: increasingly, it has become something for every
English person to aspire to: the Englishman's home is his "castle", it is interesting
that ownership is linked to house purchase, and to identify and belonging:
"myself', "I own it", "it is my own home" (my privacy). (1998: 37).
2. 2.4. The dynamism of social identity: difference, diversity and fluid identity
Jenkins insists on the dynamism of social identity through the concepts of 'similarity' and
'difference'. Similarly Beall (1997: 8) deals with 'difference' and 'diversity'.
He makes a distinction and shows its importance in communities with various identities:
"I believe this to be a helpful distinction when moving from social policy analysis to the
practice of social development". The approach of Beall is undoubtedly helpful. It avoids
conflict and can even serve as an important way of achieving peace p311icularly when
ethnicity is a serious problem.
'To diversify' as a verb, means, "to make diverse, to vary, modify, variegate". Another
interesting meaning, which meets conflict resolution criteria, is "to guard against loss".
In the context of social policy and planning, it implies having an open mind and being
receptive to different processes of integration. The act of diversity implies variations,
modification and protection against loss. Beall states that the meaning of loss here needs to
be taken in the sense of discrimination. The verb to diversify does imply action among, or
by people, rather it implies that it is a process performed on or for them. It allows
innovative intervention and interaction to flourish (1997:9). The same researcher is clear in
the following statement:
20
I would argue that it is equally important that planning, management,
partnership and activism interact creatively with diversity, which is more
dynamic and flexible concept than static one of difference.
By conh-ast the verb "to differentiate" implies "labelling, naming and othering". At best it
implies categorisation, privatisation, prioritization and potential hierarchies. At worst, it
can imply discrimination and victimization (Beall, 1997: 9).
2.3. WHAT IS ETHNIC IDENTITY? RECURENT NOTIONS OF DEFINITION
2. 3.1. The basic notion of ethnic identity
Identities are often described in terms of particular groups that individuals belong to or
with whom they associate. Fisher et al (2000: 47) define ethnic identity as a concept
refelTing to the group with which one shares a particular language, culture, religion and / or
race.
Enloe proposes that ethnic identity has both a communal and personal dimension. It refers
to a peculiar bond among persons that causes them to consider themselves a group
distinguishable from others. The content of bond is shared culture (1973: 15).
On the personal level, ethnicity equips an individual with a sense of belonging and it
positions him in society. As social relations become complex and impersonal, ethnic
identity may be grasped tenaciously. It is a familiar and reassuring anchor in a climate of
turbulence and uncertainty (Enloe, 1973: 15). The concept of ethnic identity can be defined
under various criteria; in this regard Stavenhagen (quoted in Fisher et aI, 2000: 48) lists the
following criteria that he judges as factors of ethnic identity:
• The common language is the powerful indicator of ethnic identity.
• Religion has historically been an important fomlLllator of ethnic identity. In urban
industrialised society, people interact independently of religion. But in those
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societies in which religion intervenes in public life, it may become a detem1inant
factor for ethnic identity.
• Territory is also the basis of economic and political structures. The majority of
ethnic groups in the world are identified with some territory, which is not only their
vital environment, but also their real or mythical land of origin.
• Social organization refers to institutions and social relations that provide
consistency to an ethnic group over and beyond the personal identity of its
members. Social organization establishes the boundaries of an ethnic group; it is
the framework within which 'we' and 'they', 'insiders' and 'outsiders' are
distinguished.
• Culture is often seen to include factors of language, religion and social organization
as mentioned above. Other elements include the material aspects of culture such as
cultural artefacts, and value systems, symbols and meanings, nom1S and customs,
which are shared by members of an ethnic group.
• Race is a particularly significant factor in ethnic identity. It commonly refers not
only to the biological attributes of the individuals such as skin colour, facial
features and body shape, but also to the supposed social, cultural and psychological
qualities that are associated with them. Not all ethnic differences are racial
differences, but ethnic distributions tend to be stronger and longer lasting to the
extent that they include racial criteria.
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2.3.2. The dominance of ethnic identity among social identities
At this point the distinctiveness of ethnic identity among many other social identities also
visible in society needs to be understood. BiIlington, Hockey and Strawbridge argue that
human beings live not in isolation but with others. The individual 'self is constructed
through relations and social interactions. Among these cumulative interactions are those
involving interactions with social groups, distinguished in terms of their status, power and
social characteristics (Billington, Hockey and Strawbridge, 1998: 293); As a consequence,
individuals are placed in a number of identities such as social class, religion, occupational
role and so on.
All of these identities are relevant within societies but ethnic identities possess the more
influential and distinctive aspects such as language, skin-colour differences, physical type
and appearance, and other elements that distinguish members of one ethnic group from
another. However, some researchers find that the predominance of ethnic identity does 110t
always carry effectiveness. In view of that, de Vos and Rommanuci-Ross argue that skin
colour, physiognomy and other unalterable features are of relatively minor importance.
These researchers specify that some indicators of ethnic identity which are assumed to be
intrinsic to groups or categories are often manipulated (1975: 86). An example of this
manipulation occurred in the Rwandan conflict. During the 1994 genocide many Tutsi
escaped killings by obscuring their ethnic ties and adopting clothes and manners which
were the most ethnically neutral.
2.3.3. Consciousness and awareness of ethnic identity
Identity can be seen as how the subject classifies himself. Studies on the level of ethnic
awareness of young children have established that a child has ethnic awareness and can
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correctly classify and point out different groups. Using a game involving children from
various ethnic groups, who were presented with dolls of different ethnicities, Powell-
Hopson noted the child's willingness to associate himself with the doll that is a
representation of his ethnicity. A child willingness to associate with his race depends on
the social experience that has operated to for his attitudes (Powell-Hopson, cited by
Billington, Hockey and Strawbridge, 1998:293).
A child's identity attitude is mainly conveyed to him or her via several media. These
include parents, teachers, peer groups, the mass media, the community and other cultural
communicators. Once an attitude has been fom1ed, a child begins to identify and show
preference for a particular identity. This explains how identity is flexible and how it
changes.
Furthermore, ethnic consciousness arises when in relation with other ethnic groups, two or
more ethnic groups engage in competition for various interests. Baker states that
consciousness assumes greater saliency when groups compete for scarce resources, power
or other desired goals, but group awareness also emerges when groups perceive their
valued attributes to be threatened by the action of others. Whether that threat is real or
imagined it may become a cause of friction with other groups (Baker, 1983: 11).
According to the same author group consciousness can be awakened or sharpened under
varied circumstances, including, among other, conquest, migration or other contact type
situations. Blumer argues that not all contacts lead to ethnic consciousness, threat or
conflict but when resources are scarce, groups compete for them. This exacerbates the
attributes by which groups differentiate 'we' from 'them' (Blumer cited by Baker, 1983:
11). Many researchers assume that ethnic, racial or communalist identity is basically a
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psychological phenomenon. The essence of group identify is a psychological self-
consciousness of common features shared with other individuals so that together they
constitute a group identity.
Walker (1978: 379) describes two levels of identity: that of individual or group awareness
and that of individual or group consciousness:
In terms of awareness, individuals or groups recognize their unique attributes
or "markers" but do not regard these as meaningful bases for interaction with
others, whereas with consciousness individuals or groups acknowledge their
unique traits as a unifying basis for mobilizing members for interaction with
others.
The situation of conflict occurs when diverse factors or situations act to convert awareness
in consciousness. Consciousness represents the potential for mobilisation.
The author continues that many groups live with an awareness of their identity. This
awareness is a latent and pennanent resource of consciousness. Thus, before consciousness
there is an awareness that remains donnant (Walker, 1978: 379). Geertz calls them
sentiments that remain dom1ant until particular situations arise such as when interests are
threatened or the group defends values that are judged as important. However, if the group
or its members attach no special significance to interests or values, the consciousness will
not be awakened (Geertz, cited by Walker, 1978: 340)
2.3.4. The function of ethnic identity
Anthropologists have studied ethnicity 111 its functions. Barth seeks to discover why a
group (or individuals) might wish to distinguish themselves from other group. He assumes
that while all people are understood to belong to an ethnic group, individuals are shown to
choose to activate and emphasise such allegiance and to assume a certain utilitarian
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rationality in this process, maximising the benefits to themselves (Barth, cited by Webster,
1991: 245).
In the light of above, the first function is of ethnic identity becomes a survival means in a
widely societal interaction where people use ethnic belonging for their daily struggle for
life. Bar1h argues that ethnicity increases when there is intense spatial-geographical and
social contact between groups. For example there is more chance that the Flemish people
in Brussels, who always have to speak French, will become more "consciously" Flemish
than their ethnic brothers and sisters in the rather isolated rural areas of West Flanders or
Limbourg where mother tongue is spoken. Barth emphasizes that the most isolated group
of people is probably the least ethnically self-defined (Bar1h, cited by Roosens, 1989: 12)
Another function of ethnic identity is that belonging to an ethnic group provides a way of
self-identification or self-affimlation in relation to other groups. The ethnic identity allows
a person to fulfil himself, to realise that he is unique, original, and irreplaceable as a
member of an ethnic group and irreducible from the outside to something else. As Roosens
(1989: 18) points out:
If I see and experience myself as a member of an ethnic group, and others-
fellow members and outsiders-recognise me as such, "ways of being" become
possible for me that set me apart from the outsiders. These ways contribute to
the content of my self perception, because of one's etlmic identity; one is
enclosed in some realities and simultaneously excluded from others.
Visibly, one of the impor1ant functions of ethnic identity is to confer self-esteem to its
members. When this function is not fulfilled, the ethnic identity may lose its current
attraction. When a group do not impute positive values it affect the self-esteem of
members: for example, in Rwanda, in an attempt to avoid the negative effects left by the
genocide on their 'ethnic identity', many people never affiml themselves ethnically.
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2.4. ETHNIC IDENTITY AS POTENTIAL SOURCE OF CONFLICT
2.4.1. Manipulability and constructivism theory of ethnic identity
The manipulability of ethnicity is facilitated by the absence of distinguishable ethnic
boundaries such as culture, skin colour, territory, and religion. Bruce (1994: 7) discovered
some conflicts that were more psychologically constructed than others and therefore
resulted in more complex and deep social divisions. Weber argues that ethnic membership
does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in
the political sphere. On the other hand it is primarily the political community, no matter
how artificially organised that inspires the belief in common ethnicity (Weber, cited by
Jenkins, 1997: 10)
Therefore, researchers have highlighted other aspects that define ethnicity. In this regard,
Mare argues that ethnicity is not only a common identity for people. It is also a term used
to explain occurrences (Mare, 1992:42). In order to understand the OCCUlTence of ethnic
identity, one needs to refer to experiences shared by a group of people during for example
a long victimization or marginalisation. For example, during the years of apartheid in
South Africa, ideologically the Black identity had the connotation of "oppressed people".
This led to the emergence of a collective consciousness that in turn became a powerful
factor of mobilization (Mare, 1992: 42). As Mare highlights, an ethnic identity is similar to
a story. It becomes a way of dealing with the present through a sense of identity that is
rooted in the past. Ethnic identity calls on what has been, what appears to be known and
what there is certainty about in an uncertain world (Mare, 1992: 42).
Ericksen argues that in recent years anthropologists have been concerned with the way in
which history and cultural symbols are manipulated in the creation of ethnic identities and
organisations. Such a focus implies that ethnic identity can be consciously constructed
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(Ericksen, 2002:69). The following some examples illustrate this: As Roosen argues, the
Huron Indian of Quebec are today a respected Canadian 'tribe'. Unlike many other
indigenous peoples, they have succeeded in presenting themselves to society at large as an
oppressed people with a unique, if vanishing, culture, who have for centuries been
harassed, massacred and deprived of civil and territorial rights by colonialists and
Canadian authorities (Roosens, cited in Ericksen, 2002:72). Another example is the
Thonga a South African tribe, which is disappearing as an ethnic identity and collectively
because for several decades Thonga men have been adopting Zulu ethnic identity.
According to Webster, the attitude Thonga men is highlighted by the function of the ethnic
identity proving again that the commitment to the ethnic identity is important when it is
represents substantial interests:
A widespread local belief is that one's chances of finding employment are
enhanced if one is Zulu. This may be true given the penchant of white
employers to stereotype the Zulu as strong, masculine, militaristic and reliable,
whereas most have never heard of the Thonga ... For over thirty years Zulu has
been the medium of instruction in the schools, while there is no written tradition
in Thonga. It is also true that Zulu has become the prestige language and all the
people speak it (Webster, 1992: 254).
In this case what appears to be evident is that ethnic identities are important for individuals
because they allow a positive self-image and allows access to resources. From this
perspective Cohen states that ethnicity has primarily to do with politics and economics. In
other words, ethnic groups are interest groups, and ethnicity can adapt to new contexts
(Cohen cited by Baker, 1983: 10).
In accordance with the interest or particular reasons realised by social interaction, ethnic
identity can be constructed. This aspect highlights the feature of ethnic identity as a typical
social identity. It is true that ethnicity is a social creation and a fact of nature and that
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ethnic variation does not necessary correspond to cultural variation (Ericksen, 2002:64).
Regarded as contingent on political organisation, identity is formed in situations of
competition over resources. The above author concludes that is therefore difficult to
predict which ethnic or other identities will be dominant for any given population in the
future.
Clearly, power and resources are central in the process of identity maintenance and change.
Identity is something over which sh"uggles take place and with which stratagems are
advanced. It is both a means and an end in politics (Jenkins, 1996: 25)
2.4.2. Ethnic boundary
Ethnic boundary is an important aspect of group differentiation, which works against
outsiders and insiders in a very subjective manner. Ethnic boundary is both individual and
collective. As defined by de Vos and Romanucci-Ross, it is a factor of sameness internally:
A sense of common origin, common belief and values 'common cause'
common sense of survival- in belief, a 'common cause', pennanently informed
by cultural materials; it has been of great importance in uniting members into
self-defining in groups. Growing together in a social unit, showing a common
verbal and gesturaI language allows members to develop mutually understood
accommodation, which radically diminish situations of possible confrontation
and conflict (de Vos and Romanucci-Ross, 1975:5).
Many authors have attempted to define the concept of an ethnic boundary. Jenkins argues
that the production and reproduction of differences vis-a-vis external others is what creates
the image of similarity internally, vis-a-vis external others and the image of similarity
internally (Jenkins, 1997: 12). Understanding ethnic boundary as a means of recognition of
the significant difference between 'them' and 'us', de Vos distinguishes two levels of
definition of ethnic boundary. In broad group terms it will normally be couched in tem1S of
culture, race, nation or religion. In a more narrow individual perspective, the same
difference may be described in tenus of the minutiae of behaviour. Ethnicity intervenes at
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both levels in terms of the organization of society and organization of difference (de Vos
and Romanucci- Ross, 1975:3).
Wallman describes how boundaries work in practice and function in group interaction. She
argues that members of group X are likely to work, marry, interact with other X's than
with members of Group Y, and that they are more likely to do these things in different
ways" (Wallman, 1975:30). In the following description the same researcher highlights the
structure of ethnic boundaries:
'We' of group X are not like Y's ... 'They' do not work, marry and interact with
us, the Xs, or in the way that Xs do ... we feel them to be, know them to be
different from ourselves. However all elements differentiating groups are strongly
involved in boundary formation and boundary maintenance (Wallman, 1975: 30).
Those elements are cultural ones and they play a key role in the life of group members,
resulting in creation of ethnic personality defined by Devereux as what one does more
spontaneously as a result of being socialised within an ethnic group from childhood
(Devereux, cited by de Vos and Romanucci- Ross, 1975:5).
Fried clarifies the above explanations. He argues that the boundary is something, which
differentiates members from non-members or non-members from members: the boundary
can be read from either side. According to the same author, using this logic, ethnic
boundaries must be both an interface line between inside and outside and an identity line
between 'us' and 'them': We identify 'us' differently to 'them', we use the boundary for
our purposes according to our need (s) at any given time in any given context. 'They'
identify themselves by contrast to the rest of us. They use boundary for their purposes. The
'interface' is the border around the familiar, the nom1al, and the unproblematic. The
perfom1ance, appearance, activity and social structure is different (Fried, 1983: 32).
30
2.4.3. Competitiveness
Etymologically, Jenkins defines ethnicity as a word, which comes from the ancient Greek
word 'ethnos', which seems to have referred to a range of situations in which a collectivity
of humans lived and acted together (Jenkins, 1997:9). In this definition the word 'act
together' is very interesting because it agrees with Weber's view which seems to be
suggesting that the belief in common ancestry is likely to be the convergence of collective
political action rather than causing people to see themselves as belonging together and
having a common background -as a consequence of acting together- collective interest thus
do not simply reflect- or follow from similarities and differences between people; the
put'suit of collective interest does however encourage ethnic identification (Weber, cited by
Jenkins, 1997:10).
This characteristic of ethnicity is confim1ed by Barth who emphasizes that ethnic identity
is generated, confirmed or transfom1ed in the course of interaction and transaction between
decision-making, strategising individual. Ethnicity is perhaps, before anything else, a
matter of politics, decision-making and goal orientation (Barth cited by Jenkins, 1997:12).
Cohen acknowledges the factor of competition in his definition of the ethnic organization
which is essentially viewed as a kind of political organisation. In Cohen's view, social
interaction and organization are essentially dual phenomena. They comprise aspects of
utility and aspects of meaning. Ethnicity, he argues, is an organizational fo n11, which
exploits this duality for particular ends, ends which mayor may not be acknowledged by
the agents themselves (Cohen cited in Ericksen, 2002:44).
In connection with this point, Ericksen suggests something which supports the above
theory: "ethnicity has an immediate appeal because it offers answers to perennial problems
of life: the question of origins, destiny and ultimately, the meaning of life" (2002:44). As
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outlined above, ethnic consciousness arises when, in relation with other ethnic groups, one
or many ethnic groups engage in competition for various interests. Various writers have
approached this issue. Baker states that consciousness assumes greater saliency when
groups compete for scarce resources, power or other desired goods, but group awareness
also emerges when groups perceive their valued attributes to be threatened by the action of
others, be that threat real or imagined (Baker, 1983: 11)
2.5. CONLUSION
In this chapter the concept of ethnic identity has been defined in tem1S of the study at hand,
particularly, an aspect through which this concept appears powerful as a typical social
identity. In addition the chapter explains ethnic identity as a potential source of conflict
and violence. The following chapter will examine how identities worked in Rwanda in the
whole social system before the Refom1.
32
CHAPTER THREE:
IDENTITIES BEFORE THE COLONIAL REFORM OF
ADMINISTRTION AND MAIN POINTS OF THE REFORM
3.1. IDENTITY BEFORE THE COLONIAL REFORM OF ADMINISTRATION
3.1.1. Crucial role of clans before the Colonial Reform of Administration
Before colonization in Rwanda, the clan was a fluid identity in the sense that it allowed
Rutu and Tutsi to share a common descent.
As Linden points out, Rutu and Tutsi shared membership in all the 19 mam clans of
Rwanda. Furthe11110re, the history of pre-colonial Rwanda, passed down through oral
traditions gives clear explanations assuming that speaking the same language and sharing
the same culture Rutu, Tutsi and Twa, conscientiously developed a system of clanic
belonging accompanied by a sense clanic solidarity without any consideration of economic
status (Linden and Linden, 1977: 17). This means that under the clanic identity Tutsi were
not necessarily dominant, nor were Rutu their subjects because of a supposed common
ancestral origin I. On the contrary clans constituted a basic space of solidarity between
different members from Rutu, Tutsi and Twa groups belonging to the same clan and
consequently considering themselves as brothers (Linden and Linden, 1977: 17).
Maguet argues the evidence of clanism as a factor of fluidity. Re states that all clans in
Rwanda contained Rutu, Tutsi and even Twa members (Maguet, 1961: 135). Rennie came
I The most unifying element of Rwandans before the Reform in Rwanda (1926) was the clan; only the clan
mattered (i.e. the clan one belongs to). Lineage was the other aspect that counted, this means to be able to say:
I'm the son of Mr. So and so, himself son of Mr. So and so, etc. (OPRR, 1996:72)
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to a similar conclusion confirming a stable common opinion among researchers about the
presence of Hutu and Tutsi in the same clan as an immutable factor of long-ternl unity and
diversity (Rennie, 1972: 33). Furthernlore, he mentions the blood-brotherhood pact as an
important aspect proving the social organization in Rwanda, which particularly allowed
Hutu and Tutsi from different clans to develop a brotherhood (Rennie, 1972: 34).
An attentive examination of clans in Rwanda, particularly the fact that all clans contained
Hutu, Tutsi, and even Twa members highlights the evidence that clans were not absolutely
based on common descent. Catherine Newbury clarifies this notion. She states that clan
identities in Rwanda are seen to result not from the individual relationship alone (as
implied by descent theory concepts of clan) but from the classification of groups within the
larger structure (Catherine Newbury, 1988:390). Migration is another common explanation
of Hutu and Tutsi mutability within the structure. Newbury states that a person who had
migrated to a region where he had no family ties would join an established clan for both
social and economic reasons (Catherine Newbury, 1988: 390). Clan changes were not
simply a function of movement or clientship ties but also "a result of changes in the very
conceptual categories from which clan identities derived" (Newbury, 1988: 390).
3.1.2. Social status
During the pre-colonial period, social status in Rwanda was a result of economic
differentiation and stratification between various occupations. In large part, Tutsi, Hutu
and Twa roughly corresponded to occupational categories. Thus, most academics agree
that when talking about Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, one is not dealing with tribes or ethnic
groups but with social status. As the historian David Newbury notes, the Hutu tended to be
farnlers, the Tutsi were stockbreeders and the Twa were hunters or potters (David
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Newbury, 1991: 277). David Newbury argues that many "Hum" in western Rwanda owned
cattle, sometimes in very important numbers, a family could move from one group to
another over generations as its political and economic situation changed (NewbUly, 1991:
277). Maquet (1961: 135) makes similar observations about the social mobility:
A person could be "socially recognised" as a Tutsi without having been begotten
by a Tutsi father, or that a Twa who had been ennobled or the son of a rich Hutu
cattle owner and of a Tutsi woman, was sometimes regarded as a Tutsi.
Whatever their origin, successful men tended to become Tutsi, that is, to adopt
their identity and way of life. Poor men or politically uninfluential men tended
to become Hutu.
It is assumed that social status was rarely important in every day life and could change as
people moved over vast areas in pursuit of trade or new lands, and conflicts were more
often within clan categories than between them, as people fought over sources of water,
farmland, or grazing rights.
Social mobility was common in Rwanda between Hutu and Tutsi and even involving Twa.
Economically successful Hutu and Twa became Tutsi. What is quite certain is that being a
Hutu or a Tutsi is to belong to a different wealth group, which also deternlines the kind of
relationship existing between the two ethnic groups and this is reflected at the clientship
level (www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata)
3.1.3. Clientship
When dealing with clientship, researchers adopt polemical vIews divided into two
approaches. The "existentialist approach" puts forward the conflicting essence of 'Hutu'
and 'Tutsi' assuming that conflict between Hutu and Tutsi existed before the first
European travellers reach Rwanda. The main argument proposed is that inequalities always
existed between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, and that they had nothing in common. Amongst
such proposers is Lemarchand who notes the use of the teml Hutu to mean social
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subordinate, client or ruled and the term Tutsi as meaning the patron or ruler (Lemarchand,
1988: la).
There is also a "functionalist approach" meaning that conflicting relationships between
Hutu and Tutsi are consequences of Belgium colonization. Oral considerations and
researchers in their majority strongly support the view that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa lived
together, would take wives from either group, socialise with each other, helped each other,
and fought for their country sharing everything (Maquet, 1961, ewbury, 1978, 1988,
Prunier, 1995). The following statement by Newbury supports this view:
Individuals could and did move between the categories Hutu and Tutsi as their
fortune rose and fell, and intermarriage was not uncommon. If your father
were Hutu, you would be a Hutu. But if you then made sufficient wealth, and
could buy cattle, then you might become Tutsi. There was a ceremony of
becoming Tutsi, which recognised this. Your children would be Tutsi (1988:
275).
As argued above in the traditional "Ubuhake" 1 (clientship) system, the patron/client
relationship was open resulting in a continual process of individual mobility. Accordingly,
Newbury (1988: 276) states that the Ubuhake institution appears to have kept the people
together:
It is a highly personalised relationship between two individuals of unequal
social status. This patron/client relationship involved reciprocal bonds of
loyalty and exchange of goods and services. It provided a place, a status,
within a hierarchical system. The patron was mostly Tutsi, but the client
could be Hutu or Tutsi of inferior social status.
The OPRR states that one person could be a client as well as a patron. Even Tutsi patrons
of Hutu could be clients of yet another Tutsi. Theoretically, the only person ultimately not
a client of this system was the Mwami (King of Rwandans) himself. Thus, most Tutsi were
I A form of cl ientage named "Ubuhake" in Rwandan language was a system in which a patron grants a cow and
usefruit rights a client who in return provides some form of labour (usually agricultural) for the patron.
Traditionally, Ubuhake was a relationship based on a measure of reciprocity; through such ties, the client
gained a certain level of protection and even prestige through his patron (Newbury, 1988: 275). Ubuhake was
not a universal practice in precolonial Rwanda (Maquet, 1961: 135)
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clients and some Hutu were patrons. At the top, however, there were always Tutsi and at
the bottom always Hutu and/or Twa (OPRR, 1996: 24).
Another fact clearly and commonly assumed by historians in relation with Ubuhake
system, is that it did not take a forn1 of slavery or caste. The system was circular, and
furthermore Rennie emphasizes that Hutu clients were often adopted into Tutsi lineages
(Rennie, 1972:23). Furthermore the system was not extended on the whole Rwandan
territory. The Ubuhake system, defined by the dominance of cattle symbolizing wealth and
prestige, was predominant in central Rwanda, a pastoralist region.
According to Maquet, in the northern and south-western regions, dominated by Hutu,
different systems, mostly based on land-lease contracts or donation of agricultural
products, were developed and the patrons were exclusively Hutu. This system is called
"Ubukonde,,2 (Maquet, 1961: 135).
3.1.4. Regional identities as a limitation of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities
Several researchers found variations in the meaning of the terms Hutu and Tutsi, and then
their patterns of use appear to have been a function of an area's ties to the central court. As
Newbury points out, in regions with fairly loose or nonexistent ties to the court, the terms
may not have been used at all (Newbury, 1988: 157). Consequently, any reliable analysis
has to consider the regional element of identities in pre-colonial Rwanda because Hutu and
Tutsi were not immutable or universal identities. It was perhaps this intersection of
regional aspect and wealth, which led some respondents of Newbury's research in Rwanda
to explain that the tern1 Tutsi referred to inhabitants of a certain region (Newbury, 1988:
2 Another form of clientage based on land-contract.
37
253). Father Alexis Kagame (1972: 202), a Rwandan philosopher and historian, argues that
the term Tutsi often refers not to origin (descent) but to wealth, especially with regards to
cattle:
Whoever is rich will often be referred to as Tutsi. Frequently also,
because of their manner and their language ... the inhabitants of the
provinces of central Rwanda, Nduga and Marangara, as well as those of
Buganza are referred to as Tutsi.
In fact that region was Nduga, and whoever came from Nduga (situated in central Rwanda)
was simply called Tutsi. The evidence that the central region of Rwanda was a pastoralistic
region dominated by the central court and Tutsi chiefs confirms the above statement.
Therefore, this regional feature provides an important argument about limitation of Tutsi
and Hutu identities to a particular region before colonisation.
Other groups of Tutsi could be found in other regions but in this case holding identities of
those regions such as 'Abakiga' and 'Abanyakinyaga'. It must be remembered that even in
the present day, regional identities are still used despite the limit imposed by the more
powerful Hutu and Tutsi identities, which assumed more importance since the Colonial
Refom1 of Administration.
To retUl11 to the importance of these regional identities, one must notice that many people
were more proud of their regional identities than of their Hutu-Tutsi economic status. Until
the arrival of Europeans some of these regions had been autonomous chiefdoms, which
became powerful enough to threaten the King, whose influence was limited to the central
region. For that reason, Louis notices how it was surely clear to King Musinga that without
Gem1an backing, effective control over certain outer lying regions would not have been
possible (Louis, 1996: 157). An example of this situation in the northwest is cited by
Mamdani (1996: 14),
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A region that had long prided itself on its independence from the central
court inhabitants referred to themselves, not as Hutu, but as 'Kiga' or
'Abakiga', a practice that persisted even after the end of colonial rule.
Similarly in Kinyaga, despite their intimate knowledge of Rwandan society
and practices, inhabitants refened to themselves as Kinyagans or
'Abanyakinyaga. '
However as already mentioned, a Rwandan was individually identified by his clan, the
unique universal identity in Rwanda shared by Rwandans from all families, all social
statuses, and all regions.
3.1.5. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities in the political structure before the Colonial
Reform of Administration
Examined through the traditional structure, it appears clear that Hutu and Tutsi identities
allowed social integration, meaning that each group participated at all levels of political,
economic and military functions. Vansina highlights this fact arguing that before the
Belgian Tutsification of 1930's, which resulted in the monopoly of political and
administrative power in the hands of Tutsi, traditionally Hutu, Tutsi, and even Twa,
exercised political power together (Vansina, 1962: 67).
The same researcher emphasizes that by the end of the 19th century, many areas of the
Rwandan Kingdom had developed a complex and high-organised administrative structure
encompassing provinces, districts, hills and neighbourhoods. The king (a Tutsi) was the
supreme court/judge in traditional society. High chiefs or army commanders, which could
be Hutu or Tutsi, normally administered the provinces, the districts were administrated by
two chiefs appointed by the Mwami (king), there was one cattle chief who was in charge of
cattle taxes, was always Tutsi, and there was one land chief responsible for agriculture
levies, who was always Hutu (Vansina, 1962: 67).
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According to Vansina (1962: 68) Rwanda did not and still does not have villages in the
same sense of concentrated homesteads. The hill was the basic administrative unit and
normally had not one but three main chiefs, namely:
• The "chief of the pastures" (always a Tutsi), in charge of delimiting grazing
rights;
• The "chief of land" (always a Hutu), in charge agricultural matters and land
taxes.
• The "chief of men" (Hutu or Tutsi), who was in broad tem1s, the king's army
recruiter
• The "chief of forests" (a Twa), appointed to protect forests and to manage
hunting activities. Twa are particularly known in Rwanda as people who
fulfilled the function of private infom1ers of the king
In addition many writers assert that Hutu were predominant in the very powerful king's
advisers class (Abiru). Until 1959, their head was a Hutu whose name was Rukeba.
King Rwabugiri's reign, at the end of 1800's is the best-known case illustrating the above
structure. As Des Forges explains, King Rwabugiri gave new reality to the traditional idea
that the Mwami (king) was above the distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi. He granted
important commands to Hutu, for example Chief Bisangwa who was deputy-supreme army
commander after the King. As the above author points out, he also welcomed complaints
against the notables as one way of disciplining the powerful. This is perhaps the reason
why Rwabugiri was very popular among "lowly" (Des Forges, 1972: 13).
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3.1.6. An intricate structure of identities: source of misunderstanding and
manipulation
Separated from power, wealth, clans and even regional considerations, Hutu and Tutsi
identities before the Colonial Reform of Administration of administration cannot be
understood. Their study needs to consider this large social and political organisation. The
King was Tutsi but there were several Hutu principalities, which remained defiant until the
beginning of 19th Century. They shared clans which was the most important traditional
identity that almost played the role of ethnic identity. Cattle herders were, by definition
Tutsi. Moreover, all activities and institutions displayed the mixing between Hutu and
Tutsi and every one whether Hutu or Tutsi spoke the same language.
In the light of above any distinction in pre-colonial Rwanda was not a simple distinction
because of social mobility one could be born into one group and die as another.
Unfortunately, in the face of this complexity, and with the desire of domination, the
colonizers found it very easy to define Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as three distinct ethnic groups.
The existing diversity then became a source and means of division. As Sanders points out,
this distinction has been greatly exaggerated both by European colonialists and
missionaries stressing the superiority of Tutsi to Hutu:
... We will have no better, more active and more intelligent chiefs than the
Tutsi. They are the ones best suited to understand progress and the ones
population likes best; the government must work mainly with them
(Sanders, 1969: 251).
The Belgians acted in the most bmtal fashion towards colonised Africans. They
were not willing to spend the time and energy dealing with the 'intertwined
fingers' of Rwandan, between Tutsi-Hutu relations, it was much easier to divide
society between Tutsi and Hutu" (Kimber, 1996: 2).
The lack of consensus in interpreting certain information about Rwanda
particularly the origin of Tutsi became one factor underpinning the creation of
ethnicity (Pamphile, 2000: 87).
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Without any effort the system of clientship was confused with feudality in the Europe of
Middle-Ages, and as observed by Pamphile, the clientship, which was not a segregating
aspect of the Rwandan social structure gave the Belgians the basic means for a new ethnic
vision of Hutu and Tutsi identities (Pamphile, 1999: 87). By the end of 1920's, the logic of
rule through ethnic division culminated in the Reform that discriminated Hutu in the eyes
of the colonial administration. Since then, all Hutu have been associated with inferior
status. Linden states that several colonizers and missionaries adopted humiliating attitudes
as one administrator had openly declared: " ... a Hutu does not want to be commanded by a
Hutu" (Linden and Linden, 1977: 162). Thus Hutu were appointed for labour-intensive
works ("Akazi").
3.2. EARLIER ANTHROPOLOGICAL HYPOTHESIS: UNINTENDED SEED OF
DIVISION
The first Europeans who reached Rwanda were interested in understanding the people of
Rwanda and found that with characteristics such as solid institutions organization and
physical features of Tutsi, already qualified as a 'Caucasian race'. Logically this motivated
explorers and anthropologists to establish the first hypothesis about the origin of Tutsi.
Frederick of Mecklenburg, 1912: 370) was the first German researcher to write a book on
Rwanda. He describes the population as follows:
...The population is divided into three classes - the Watussi, the Wahutu, and the
Watwa, a pygmy tribe, who dwell chiefly in the bamboo forest of Bugoe, the
Swamps of Lake Bolero, and on the island of Kwidschwi on Lake Kiwu [... ] The
primitive inhabitants are the Wahutu, an agricultural Bantu tribe, who one must
say, look after digging and tilling ... they are medium sized people, whose ungainly
figures betoken hard toil, and who patiently bow themselves in abject bondage to
the later alTived yet ruling race, the Watussi.
The above author connects the Tutsi with the great tribal movement, which brought the
Massai race to East Africa. The same argument that led observers at the beginning of
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colonization to believe that the Massai came from the north of Africa and more
particularly from Egypt, or perhaps even from the Middle-East (Israel), may also hold
good in the case of the Tutsi (Frederick of Mecklenburg, 1912: 369) .
Although many researchers have endeavoured to trace the origin of the words Butu and
Tutsi, it is not easy to trace the origin of these problematic words. Bishop Kanyamacumbi
is among recent researchers who had dedicated many pages to this issue, but his
conclusions are only hypotheses. For him, the only obvious fact is that it is enough to trace
the origin of Butu and Tutsi to both Western and Central Africa Regions (Kanyamacumbi,
1995:87).
Many other researchers such as Schepatz and Ki-zerbo take the same view mainly due to
certain archaeological discoveries I.
The particular origin of Tutsi has raised many hypotheses the most passionate of which
was Bamitic hypothesis2. The Bamitic hypothesis is based on a stereotype which alleges
that any well-organised institution, such as political administration and a social
organisation, can never be forn1Ulated and carried out by Black people. It is rather thought
to be the work of people of white origin (OPRR, 1996i.
In a reappraisal of Rwanda 's historiography, several researchers such as Fujii qualify the
Hamistic view in terms of a pseudo-scientific theory called Bamistic hypothesis, which
I After archaeological findings Shepal1z and Ki-zerbo argue that there is no evidence to ascribe Tutsi origin in
Ethiopia or Abyssinia. On the contrary they state that some Ethiopian ethnic groups such Galas would find their
origin in Great Lake Region (Rwigamba, 2003: 42)
2 The word "hamite" takes its origin in one hypothesis assuming that Tutsi are descends ofa biblical personage
called Chem (and then Chemites, Chamites and finally Hamites descendants) son Noah, this explains their
Semitic origin, their organizational and physical superiority to their neighbouring Negro ethnic groups such as
Hutu and Twa (Rwigamba, 2003: 43).
3 The office of the President of the Republic of Rwanda, appointed a team of thinkers to organise debates and
analyses of the issue of ethnicity in Rwanda (OPRR Report, 1996).
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ranked all races according to innate intelligence and abilities (Fujii, 2001). According to
Sanders, the Hamitic hypothesis assumes that every trace and or sign of what is usually
termed "civilised" in Africa was attributed to alien, mainly Hamitic origin. The same
author emphasizes that Tutsi Hamites were supposedly Caucasian in origin, which
explained their superiority to other non-Caucasian races particularly the "Negroes" of sub-
Saharan Africa (Sanders 1969: 530). As Des Forges points out, the Belgians assumed that
Tutsi had descended from a different people than the perceived dumber, lazier Hutu, and
had probably migrated to the region from the North, presumably from Egypt or Ethiopia
(Des Forges, j 999:36).
Describing the Tutsi as a superior race was also based on biological arguments. Fujii states
that certain physical characteristics that distinguished many Tutsi from most Hutu, such as
the Tutsi's taller builds, thinner noses and lighter- coloured skin, provided the physical
evidence confimling the Hamitic view (Fujii, 2001). In addition to biological superiority,
however, Tutsi were also anointed with cultural superiority. As Sanders explained:
Because the Hamites discovered in Africa South of Sahara were described
as pastorals and the traditional occupation of the egro was supposedly
agriculture, pastoralism and all its attributes became endowed with an aura
of superiority of culture, giving the Hamites a third dimension: cultural
identity (1969: 530).
3.3. THE COLINIAL REFORM OF ADMINISTRATION IN RWANDA: MAIN
CHARACTERISTICS
3.3.1. Role of the colonial administration
Rwanda experienced three phases of colonisation, the first phase of German colonization
(1896-1916), military occupation by the Belgians (1916-1924) following the defeat of
Gemlan troops in Rwanda by the end of the First World War, the official Belgian
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occupation of Rwanda (1924-1962) under the mandate of the Society of Nations, which
later became the United Nations.
At the start of the Gem1an colonization, Hutu and Tutsi identities were not entrenched and
relations remained almost unchanged until the Belgian Colonial Reform (1926-1931). The
Germans used the existing social structure to fulfil their colonial interests as Frederick of
Mecklenburg (1912: 369) argues:
The people hold their "Mwami" which is the official name of Sultan, in the
greatest awe and reverence [... ] it is desired to strengthen and enrich the
Mwami in authority, and to increase thereby their interest in the continuance
of German rule, so that the desire for revolt shall die away, as the
consequence.
Although Germans affim1ed the superiority of Tutsi over the Hutu, the country was
allowed to keep its traditional organization and the Mwami was given full jurisdiction over
his fellow-people, helped by traditional chiefs (Hutu and Tutsi) as it was before the arrival
of Germans. By contrast, when the Belgians succeeded the Germans, they transforn1ed the
state structure to exclude Hutu and Twa entirely. They became a subject people.
From 1926 to 1931, there was an important reform of administration commonly known in
Rwanda as the "Mortehan's Reform" referring to the Belgian Resident (colonial
representative) who put it place execution under the supervision of Voisin who was the
Belgian Governor of Ruanda-Urundi at that time based in Bujumbura. With the Reform,
Belgians decided to take control of Rwanda by indirect rule. As OPRR points out, Frank
who was the minister of colonies wrote a letter of principle on Rwanda's structure: " ... the
government have to use indirect rule, which means to get under control the whole
Rwandan population by using Tutsi" (OPRR, 1996: 120).
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As Prunier argues, the ruling class, which had under German rule contained elements of
Hutu and Twa, was changed into one almost wholly made up of Tutsi who were willing to
act entirely in accordance with the colonialist's wishes (Prunier, 1995:21)
Thus the Belgians rammed through a methodical transformation of the previous social
traditional structure:
• The previous system of having three chiefs for each area, one at least of whom was
nomlally a Hutu, was replaced by having a single chief for every locality. By the
end of the Colonial Reform of Administration in 1931, 43 out of 45 chiefs were
Tutsi as well as 549 sub-chiefs out of 553 (Kimber, 1996:6)
• Hutu principalities were suppressed resulting in deprivation of political
representatives of Hutu as group. Forced labour was imposed on the Hutu.
According to Kimber, various compulsory work activities for the state could absorb
over half of a man's time. Those who refused such work were punished and
sometimes abused (Kimber, 1996: 7). As Newbury emphasizes, the colonial law,
institutionalised "Uburetwa" (forced labour) which became required of all Hutu
men and thus "symbolised the servitude of the Hutu (Newbury, 1988: 141)
• The educational policy became one of the most effective means by which the
Belgians and the Catholic Church suppressed the eliminated Hutu. According to
Linden, the goal was to train the Tutsi elite who would form the nucleus of a
colonially administered government bureaucracy and the next generation of
Rwandan rulers and chiefs (Linden and Linden, 1977: 152). To accommodate and
fmiher encourage this process, the Catholic Church adjusted its educational policies
in order to train the Tutsi elite and in 1928 founded the "Indatwa" (Elite) school in
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Astrida (Butare: Appendice 3), which was managed by the Brothers of Charity.
With some exceptions, Hutu received only the minimum education required for
working in the mines and industry.
By the end of 1929 the consecration of Tutsi elite resulted in ethnically defined
"Christian aristocracy" composed of Tutsi (Newbury, 1988: 115). In order to
reinforce the ethnic cleavage, the Belgian administration introduced identity cards.
On the basis of quite arbitrary criteria, every Rwandan was henceforth registered as
Tutsi, Hutu or Twa (Maquet, 1961 :56)
In a three-way entente between the Belgian administration, the Catholic Church,
and the Tutsi elite, the lowly Hutu was caught, as Newbury points out. In the course
of carrying out their official duties, chiefs found innumerable ways to enrich
themselves, at the expense of a majority of lowly Hutu, Tutsi and Twa (Newbury,
1988: 128)
• Introduction of taxes and "uburetwa" (forced labour). A compulsory tax was
required from every man who had to pay three and half (3.5 francs) per year.
However before providing for the new Rwandan authorities salary in the colonial
budget in 1940s, these authorities had been paid with the money that was deducted
from the tax according to how much was the collected tax (OPRR, 1996: 62). Thus,
in order for those authorities to collect more taxes, and thereby ensure their own
salaries, they pestered any man, young and old.
According to Newbury, the most hated and humiliating was 'Uburetwa', a
particularly servile fonn of clientship that required a client to perfonn manual
services for the local hill chief as payment for use of land. Under colonial law
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'Uburetwa' became required of all Rutu men and thus symbolized the servitude of
Rutu vis-a-vis the dominant small group of privileged from Tutsi group (Newbury,
1988: 141). In order to escape the new harassing administration many Rutu fled to
British colonies. Accordingly Reyntjens (1985: 141) states that,
Around 1930, there were SO, 000 Rwandans (i.e. one young man or one
man in six) who emigrated to Uganda, and almost all of them came back
and went back again. Until 1959, Rwandans who were known as having
been to Uganda were numbering 350. 000, 35.000 others had gone to
Tanzania. They were fleeing corvees (forced labour) cultivating fallow
land, growing coffee, tax and severe punishments, which were provided
for those who did not catTy out this forced labour.
• The ultimate consequence of the Colonial Refonn of Administration was that the
monarchy lost value. The king lost the right to give cows or take them back from
the chiefs without the Belgian Resident's approval. The Govemor prohibited the
function of king's secret advisors. The head of king's secret advisors, Gashamura
was exiled away to Gitega in Burundi. The monarchy's image changed and lost its
forces. The King lost his freedom and he was no longer capable of taking decisions
and implementing strategies of freely goveming the country. He was not Rwanda's
mediator any more as he had been previously. Within the framework of the
Colonial Refoml of Adminish'ation, Musinga remained with only the name of King
(OPRR, 1996: 8).
Because of his increasing opposition to the Belgian changes, in a decree from the
King of Belgium, Musinga was deposed on 12 November 1931. Rudahigwa, a son
of Musinga was proclaimed as the new King of Rwanda. Rudahigwa had strong
support from the Beligian rulers and the Catholic Church. Musinga was moved to
Kamembe in Northem Rwanda but the population continued to go to him as their
King, obliging colonial authorities to move him to Kalemie (in Belgian Congo)
(OPRR, 1996: 9).
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3.3.2. The influence of the Catholic Church
During the Colonial Reform of Administration, Catholicism considered itself and was
considered as a government religion. Fathers gave advice to colonial authorities, and
participated in enforcing some instruction, such as appointing or dismissing some chiefs.
As de Lacger points out, at that time many documents were written by priests suggesting
that the Tutsi were more intelligent than the Hutu and that it was the Tutsi who could
govern. This attitude is reflected in a letter written by Monsignor Leon Paul Class, Bishop
of Rwanda to Mortehan the Belgian Resident of Rwanda, dated 21, September 1927:
If we want to be practical and look after the real interest of the country we shall
find a remarkable element of progress with the Watussi youth [... ] Ask Bahutu
whether they prefer to be given orders by an uncouth person or by nobles and
the answer will be clear: they prefer the Watussi, and quite rightly so. Born
chiefs, the latter have a knack of giving orders. [ ... ] Here lies the secret of how
they peacefully managed to settle in this country and hold it in their grip (Cited
in Linden and Linden, 1977: 31).
Declarations like this without doubt promoted beliefs of superiority among Tutsi when
Hutu almost certainly developed beliefs of inferiority. This became a seed of
discrim ination and division. This collaboration between the Church and the Belgian
colonisers is proved by the General Governor of Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi who
actively participated in the religion feats such as the Church jubilee of 50 years in Rwanda
(OPRR, 1996: 16).
The colonial authorities' support of Catholic Church was accompanied by the oppression
of other religions. Consequently there were disputes between religions themselves: such as
between Catholics and Lutherans and Catholics and Muslims. These disputes were instilled
in the members of the Church as well (OPRR, 1996: 17).
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3.4. CONCLUSION
The system of identities in Rwanda was particularly complex in comparison with ethnicity
in other countries but it allowed unity and diversity. This system was characterized by
three major factors: clans, classes (clientship) and regions.
This chapter defined the Colonial Reform of Administration. In brief, Rwandans had their
own method of organising administration that had unified them since the existence of their
nation. In the following chapter attention will be paid to factors used by Belgians to
manipulate and to mobilise Rutu, Tutsi and Twa in the programme of colonial state to
destroy the traditional order and the tragic consequences it had on the unity of Rwandans.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
PRESENTATION, DISCUSSION AND I TERPRETATION OF
FINDINGS
4.1 PRESENTATIO OF I TERVIEW'S PARTICIPA TS
Interviews were conducted with ten people (5 Hutu, 4 Tutsi and 1 Twa). There were six
men and four women. The ages varied between 22 and 85 years and the level of education
varied between primary school and post-graduate. The most important tasks of the research
were to explore the colonial Refom1 as a catalyst of ethnicity in Rwanda that affected
relations between Tutsi and Hutu. Interviews were reasonably detailed but took a
maximum of forty minutes to conduct. Many interviews' respondents were reluctant to
participate in the conversational interviews on this topic (ethnicity and conflict in Rwanda)
but the old category of participants was more enthusiastic during the conversations.
4.2. DEMOGRAPHIC DISCUSSION
A total of 145 questionnaires were administered to respondents but only 120
questionnaires were retumed completed.
Based on the results, the respondents fell into the following categories: men (64%), urban
(56%), educated (60%) and young respondents (53, 3 %). This openness can be explained
by their accessibility and their ability to understand and to fill in the questionnaire rapidly.
The rest of respondent's categories (women, rural and uneducated) were reluctant to
participate and less available, and many of them required an assistant to fill in the
questionnaire for them.
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Younger than 60years 64 53.3
Older than 60 years 56 46.7






4.3. ATTTITUDES OF RESPONDENTS RELATNG TO MANIPULATION OF
IDENTITIES DURING THE COLONIAL REFORM OF ADMI ISTRATION
In this pari of the study data will be discussed and interpreted centring around three major
themes related to the objectives and questions of the study:
• Identity before the Refoml
• Factors of manipulation during the Refoml
• Implications on relationships between Hutu and Tutsi
Each theme will reflect the attitudes of the survey's respondents and the interview's
respondents.
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Table 4.2. Data relating to the case study: frequencies and percentages of responses




Tutsi and Hutu referred to
economic position
Agree 68 56.7
Not sure 25 20.8
Disagree 27 22.5
2. Before the reform, clan
was the most important
and unifying identity
Agree 81 67.5
Not sure 28 23.3
Disagree 11 09.2




Not sure 26 21.7
Disagree 2S 20.8
4.The Reform generated
privileges for Tutsi and
discrimination against
Hutu creating a violent
division
Agree 85 70.8
Not sure 17 14.2
Disagree 18 15
5. Ethnic mention in
identity cards contributed
to the development of
ethnic beliefs
Agree 86 72
Not sure 11 09
Disagree 23 19
6 Forced labour imposed to






Not sure 24 20
Disagree 20 17
7. Hamitic myth reinforced
division between Hutu and
Tutsi
Agree 91 76
Not sure 22 18
Disagree 07 06
8. The Catholic Church
played a crucial role in




Not sure 23 19.2
Disagree
9. The Rwandan elites used
ethnicity as unique means
of access to power
exacerbating division
Agree 80 66.7




resource of insecurity for
all ethnic groups
Agree 70 58.3
Not sure 30 25
Disagree 20 16.7
11. The Colonial Reform of
Admin. resulted in
structural violence and
finally lead to a cycle of
violence 79 65.8
Agree 27 22.5








Not sure 31 25.8
Disagree 03 2.5
13. Reduction of poverty
can be used as means of
peace and unity
74.1Agree 89
Not sure 17 14.2
Disagree 14 11.7
14. Democracy, justice,
education for peace can
help in reconciliation.
59.2Agree 71
Not sure 40 33.3
Disagree 09 07.5
15. National identity and
c1anic solidarity can
reinforce the unity and
reconciliation.
Agree 77 64.2
ot sure 29 24.2
Disagree 14 11.6
16. The integration of the
Twa group in the process of
the reconciliation in
Rwanda can be a means of
peace making.
Agree 65 54.2
Not sure 05 04.2
Disagree 50 41.6
4.3.1. Attitudes of respondents regarding identities in Rwanda before the Reform
4.3.1.1 Role of clans before the Reform
As a unifying element in Rwanda, 67.5 % (Table 5.2) of the survey's respondents found
clans useful before the Reform. In addition, the majority of the interview's respondents
shared this opinion. Also notable is the influence of the variable of 'Age' on responses:
The 89.3% of respondents (Table 5.3) who agreed with the above view were over 60 years
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old, while in the category younger than 60 years only 48.4% agreed as represented in the
following table (Table 4.3):
Table 4.3 Cross-tabulation of age and responses relating to clans before the Colonial
Reform of Administration
Before the Colonial Reform Age Total
of Administration clans
were the most important Younger than 60years Older than 60years
identity and unifying factor old old
in Rwanda
Agree 31 (48.4%) 50 (89.3%) 81(67.5%)
Not sure 26 (40.6%) 2 (3.6%) 28(23.3%)
Disagree
7 (11%) 4 ( 71 %) 11(9.2%)
Total 64( I00%) 56( I00%) 120(100%)
One can easily understand the reason for this discrepancy. The old people grew up when
the traditional structure dominated by clans was still influential in 1940's. On the contrary,
young respondents grew up in a social structure already influenced by ethnicity since 1959.
Generally all the interview's respondents from the old category stated that clans were a
unifying factor. In addition many of them argued that clans were a powerful element of
Rwandan culture. One of participants explained disappointingly his view as follows:
... Ask a man of my age to tell you his ethnic identity, he will say for example
"I'm "Umwega" I or "Umusinga" ... but if you ask the same question to a young
man of 25 years he will immediately tell that he is Hutu or Tutsi [... ] these are
fruits of political propaganda. My clan is "Umwega" and I'm proud of it, with
other "Bega", from Hutu, Tutsi or Twa groups we share brotherhood because we
believe in common ancestors. But how can you be proud of Hutu or Tutsi
identities with their histories of killings? Who is ancestor of Hutu? Who is
ancestor of Tutsi?
I A name of one of powerful and prestigious clan, known for its rivalry with Nyiginya, another powerful and
dynastic clan in Rwanda
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Furthermore many researchers found that all Rwandans (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) shared
clans. In his research on clans of Rwanda, Hertefelt argues that ethnic identity referred in
ancient Rwanda without any doubt to "Umwega", "Umusinga", "Umusindi" (Hertefelt,
1971:31). Similarly the OPRR stresses the role of clans arguing that when "Umusinga",
"Umwega"or "Umusindi" travellers (be they Hutu, Tutsi or Twa), arrived among other
"Basinga" ... he was well received and feeling at home (OPRR, 1996:5).
Bloom highlights above statements with the role that the social environment plays in an
awareness of social identities. He states that the development of self-awareness is mediated
to the child by the attitudes of his environment or family. The family does not need to
make specific pronouncements about the social meaning of the child's colour or race.
Approval or disapproval can be communicated by implicit acceptance and rejection of
attitudes and behaviours (Bloom, 1971: 48)
4.3.1.2. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa: economic positions
The majority of survey's respondents (56.7%: Table 5.2) believe that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa
referred to economic positions rather than tribes before the Refoml. Similarly the majority
of the interview's respondents stated that these identities referred to economic position. In
his study on Hutu and Tutsi conflict Newbury (1988: 170) comes to a similar conclusion:
The origin of the term Hutu and Tutsi is obscure, but in fact Tutsi refers to a
noble, as Hutu refers to a commoner and not to different tribes. As
demarcations of status, he goes on to explain, Hutu and Tutsi were not
immutable categories. Powerful Hutu lineages, for example, that had acquired
respect and influence amongst neighbours and the local administration might
be absorbed into the upper class and its Hutu origins forgotten. Merging was
apparently preferred over competing.
57
Additional evidence is found in the writings of Kagame, a prominent Rwandan philosopher
and historian. He argues that whoever possesses many heads of cattle is called Tutsi
(Kagame, cited in Newbury, 1988: 253).
Asked to clarify their position about the origin of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, all respondents
gave vague views; for example one of them stated that what is quite certain is that to be
Hutu or Tutsi is to hold different levels of wealth, cattle or agricultural occupation.
Another respondent argued that one should bear in mind that the Hutu and Tutsi concepts
existed for a very long time. Moreover, in their attempt to understand the background of
the Hutu and Tutsi identities, researchers found that the words Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were
present in monarchical family trees (Ubucurabwenge in Kinya-rwanda, the common
language of all Rwandans). These Hutu and Tutsi concepts were also present in poems
praising acts of bravery under King Cyirima Rujugira's reign, which dates as far back as
the 1650 's (OPRR, 1996: 59). In relation to inequalities among the three ethnic groups,
respondents approved their existence, but they argued that no one was condemned to stay
in the same group, social mobility was frequent.
There was no visible correlation in Rwanda, between ethnicity and class, which means that
there was not a situation that people belonging to specific clan or tribe also belonged to
specific social classes. Clan or ethnic membership seems to not have appeared to operate
as an important factor in class membership. Linden (cited by Martin, 1998) uses the telm
class to refer to a group of people having the same relationship to the mode of production.
(www.law.emory.Ed LIfE! LRlvo ILimes/fa1198/martin. I1tml)
As in the previous cross-tabulation of age and responses regarding clans, the same variable
is operational in the question of economic status in the category of respondents over 60
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years, 83,9 % believe that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa referred to economic positions while only
32.8% of those aged below than 60 years believe the same:
Table 4.4. Cross-tabulation of age and Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as economic positions
Before the Reform Hutu, Tutsi and Twa Age Total
referred to economic positions
Less than 60 More than 60
Agree 21(32.8%) 47 (83.9%) 68(56.7%)
Not sure 19(29.7%) 6(10.7%) 25(20.8%)
Disagree
24 (37.5%) 3(05.4%) 27(22.5%)
Total 64 (100%) 56( I00%) 120 (100%)
The strong divergence of attitudes may be attributable to the fact that for the young
category of respondents many decades of political mobilization have actively used ethnic
identities. Hutu politicians often compared clientship with feudality and even slavery
during their campaign against the Tutsi. However, some researches proved that at the
beginning of the 20th Century there were more Tutsi in clientship than Hutu. For example
in Butare a city in Southem Rwanda, the research demonstrated that only 8.2% of 207
questioned persons agreed that their grandfathers were clients; 6.6% whom were Hutu,
12.3 % being Tutsi, and 16.0 % of their fathers (16% were Hutu, while 19.3% were Tutsi).
These results are unambiguously presented bellow (Table 4.5):
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Table 4.5. Situation of clientship in Butare in beginning of 20th Century
Question Hutu Tutsi
Yes No Yes No
Was your grandfather a 6,6% 83,4% 12,3% 77,7%
client?
Was your father a client? 16% 84% 19,3% 70%
(Saucier, quoted in OPPR, 1996:33).
In consequence:
• Clients were very few
• There were more Tutsi clients than Hutu and Twa clients
• Clientship was increased during the colonial period.
Even if there was clientship in some parts of the country this does not mean that there had
been clientship for a very long time, because there were other places (such as Kinyaga) in
which c1ientship did not exist or had just started in the 19th century such as in Kinyaga
(Newbury, 1978)
4.3.1.3 Hutu-Tutsi participation in the traditional political structure
The majority of interview respondents (57, 5%: Table 5.2) and survey respondents believe
that before the Colonial Refo1111 of Administration Hutu, Tutsi and Twa had participated
without discrimination in political and social responsibilities. Globally the interview's
respondents, particularly in the old category, stated that although the King was a Tutsi,
Hutu subjects were represented. Further they specified that within Rwanda, three men, all
of them representing the King ruled each locality:
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...The Mwami (King) was the top authority and supreme chief of all annies.
He nOlmally appointed in hills Tutsi as cattle chief, Hutu as chief of land, the
chief of men were Tutsi and sometime Hutu. However, our interview's
respondents argued in their majority that the appointment of Twa in this
structure was rare.
The above statement agrees with the sense ofYansina's research assuming that as head of
the late 19th century Rwandese state, the Mwami (King) owned all land and cattle. He ruled
despotically, but had a political board of great chiefs and a pem1anent council of Abiru
(ritual specialists) who advised him about the divine obligations connected to his office.
The great chiefs appear to have been dominated by Tutsi, while the ritual specialists of the
Abiru seem to have been Hutu (Yansina, 1962).
With regards to am1Y, the respondents stated that the army was the most symbolic act of
patriotism and unity of the Rwandan Nation. This is confim1ed by Kimber (1996: 136):
... War with neighbours' states, which was quite common, took two forms. Often
it was a largely unifying act when annies would gather but the fighting was
confined to "champion" from either side. The Tutsi and Twa dominated this sOli
of war. But when more serious combat was necessary, the Hutu took the leading
part. For example the great Rwandan conqueror Kigeli IV Rwabugiri 1853-
1885), who meant business when he went into battle, preferred to recruit mostly
Hutu armies, which were perhaps less elegant but more efficient, so war acted as
a "social coagulant", breaking differences.
In the same way Vansina agues that the am1Y had a 'multi-ethnic' composition, stratified in
the way that Hutu and Tutsi were higher military officers but the majority of Hutu were
higher intem1ediate ranks followed by Twa (Yansina, 1962). What becomes clear is that
the social traditional structure in Rwanda was an integrating one in relation to Hutu and
Tutsi identities. Even the smallest Twa group, at a certain level was represented more than
it is at the present time.
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4.2.2. Factors of ethnicity as result of the Colonial Reform of Administration
4.2.2.1. Privileges for Tutsi, discrimination against Hutu
The majority of survey's respondents (70, 8%: Table 5.2) and interview's respondents
admitted that the Tutsi were more privileged in ternlS of social and economic means, and
that this was accompanied by discrimination against Hutu during the Refornl of 1926. In
summary, the interviewees argued that that between 1926 and 1931, the Belgians followed
a policy aimed at restructuring the Rwandan traditional administration. They
systematically dismissed Hutu and Tutsi chiefs appointed by the King. As one respondent
said,
There is a lot one can say about origins of fight between Hutu and Tutsi, but
the main point is the discrimination against Hutu which reached their hearts
and minds as it was accompanied by speeches stating that Hutu are good
executers of physical works and orders while Tutsi were described as b0111
chiefs and more intelligent. Since then, Hutu and Tutsi became prisoners of
these negative ideas.
Another imp01tant factor of this conflict is that Belgians introduced taxes and many [01111S of
punishments and the Hutu were victims of increasing resentment against the Tutsi as noticed a
respondent:
...The tax was progressively increased and when collecting taxes for the
colonial Administration, Tutsi chiefs harassed Hutu who in consequence
developed resentment against all Tutsi'. 'People were beaten and imprisoned
for days and months or years ... Their bad actions were ordered by Belgians,
then Tutsi chiefs and chief- assistants had to show commitment in execution
of instruction given by colonialists, because they could also be dismissed. In
fact, punishments were often accompanied by really going too far due to the
will of chief or the chief-assistant.
The general colonial atmosphere was hostile towards the Hutu but the most discriminating
factor against the Hutu was education. According to OPRR 'Nyanza School' was the first
School to be established in 1919 by the Belgian colonial government. This school was
intended for Tutsi, and was often called the 'School for the chief-children'. It closed in
1935, after the Secondary School of Astrida "Astrida School" had just started.
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Among the 48 chiefs who were governing, in 1950's, only 14 had studied at School in
Butare while the others had been educated at the public School Nyanza as well as in other
schools. It is clear that this Colonial government's School which was in the category of
primary Schools, had an important role to play in the future of governing Rwanda (OPRR,
1996:18)
However, all doors were not totally closed for Hutu. As Linden points out, the Catholic
Seminary offered other avenues for advancement since it was the only way Hutu could
obtain a secondary education (Linden and Linden, 1977:200)
Hutu were also able to emigrate and to achieve social improvement but ga1l1111g a
consciousness of ethnic discrimination, as Newbury (1988, 177-178) notes:
For despite the structures of the Belgium- Tutsi controlled state, a small group
of Hutu was able to achieve economic security mainly through labour
migration and the church. It was in this limited avenue of advancement that
Hutu were exposed to new ideologies that contrasted sharply with the reality
of their subjugated state at home ... while this consciousness started out as one
of class, it quickly shifted to an ethnic ideology.
On the other hand, the social and political discrimination against the Hutu went hard-in-
hard parallel with the impoverishment of a large body of Tutsi. With the exception of a
small group of privileged Tutsi, particularly a small class of colonial collaborators, the
Reforn1 resulted in serious economic problems for the majority of Tutsi due to changes
occasioned by the new colonial state. As Linden and Linden (1977 :226) highlight:
The facile division between Tutsi cattle-owning and Hutu subsistence forming
poverty, always an oversimplification, became thoroughly misleading after the
war. During the colonial period a large body of Tutsi became, or remained,
impoverished and lacked cattle, while returning Hutu migrants and successful
coffee-growers accumulated cows and were relatively prosperous.
To reinforce the above statement, Prunier cites the results of a survey in mid-1950's of
representative sections of the population excluding holders of political office. This survey
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showed that the average household income of Hutu and Tutsi families were, in fact very
similar whilst the Twa families had a very much lower income.
Table 4.6. Ethnic comparison of economic income in Rwanda in mid-1950's






These shifts in economic relations, coupled with the emergence of an educated Hutu elite
from seminaries, created the conditions of ethnic competition for scarce resources.
In this regard Lemarchand (1970: 139) argues,
... For those few Hutu who were able to obtain a secondary education, the
world outside the seminary fairly reflected the Tutsi- dominated inside.
Educated Hutu were unable to rise beyond lowest ranks of the civil services
and found themselves shut out from most avenues of social and economic
advancement simply because of their "Rutuness". Being systematically denied
opportunities to which they felt entitled bred a growing resentment and sense
of injustice among these small elite.
OPRR (1996: 19) emphasizes the issue of what was already known as a competition for
scarce resources:
... Those from seminaries had no known profession. Apart from some of them
who were Tutsi and who were helped by their relatives in order to be appointed
as chief- assistants, and a few others who became teachers in primary schools,
most of them remained jobless. Those who could do it went outside, like
Usumbura, Bukavu. That fact of being jobless for those from seminaries
generated some thing like jealousy, because the colonial govemment was not
taking care of them. Instead of doing that, they were kept at distance.
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Frustration, marginalisation and inequality are some of the reasons, which
generated the disputes between the elites before 1959.
As argued previously, a scarcity of environmental resources, combined with policies of the
Reform created a context within which ethnic affiliations took place, thereby raising
competition between Hutu and Tutsi. These statements highlight why anti-Tutsi attitudes
were reportedly much stronger among more educated Hutu than among the mass of the
Hutu population. As illustration, the following table shows that the majority of uneducated
respondents reacted with a 'not sure' (58.3%) answer about privileges given to Tutsi and
discrimination against Hutu. This means that ethnicity became important in this category
of the population only after mobilization by politicians.
Table 4.7. Cross-tabulation of level of education and privileges for Tutsi,
discrimination against Hutu
The Reform generated Level of Education Total
privileges for Tutsi and
discrimination against Uneducated Educated
Hutu creating a violent
division
Agree 20 (41.7%) 65 (90.3%) 85 (70.9%)
Not sure 28 (58.3) 04 (5.5%) 32 (26.6%)
Disa2ree
00 (0%) 03 (4.2) 03 (2.5%)
Total
48 (100%) 72 (100%) 120(100%)
A careful review of the evidence shows that ethnic affiliations became more salient among
the elite than among the peasant or uneducated classes. In this regard, Varyrynen (1996)
argues that at the cenh"e of the question of why violent etlmic identification takes place, is
the question of why some of identities become securitised. In other words identity is
perceived to be threatened in a manner that the only way to maintain or, rather, construct
the identity is seen to be an issue of survival. In general, issues become securitised when
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leaders, whether political, societal, or intellectual begin to talk about them in tenns of
existential threats against some valued revered object. Securitization is thus, in essence, an
'intersubjective establishment of an existential treat with a saliency, sufficient to have
substantial political effects requiring emergency measures outside the nonnal bounds of
political procedure" (www.gmu.eduiacademic/pcs/varyrvn.html)
4.3.2.2. Attitudes of respondents a propos ethnic mention in identity cards
An impressive majority of our survey's respondents (72%: Table 5.2) and many of the
interview's respondents support what view? One of the interview respondent argued that
the mention of ethnic belonging in identity card was indirect publicity of ethnic difference
and as such, it had been a direct cause of the division in Rwanda by obliging Hutu, Tutsi
and Twa to think that they are different ethnic groups. More clearly, another respondent
stated that the identity card was an administrative way that ranked the identities of people
and this influenced the perceptions of the holders of those ethnic cards. To be a Tutsi was a
'positive' identity or 'Good' identity, whereas to be a Hutu was a less valued identity.
Linden and Linden (1977) highlight that the card distribution by Belgians eliminated
uncertainty as to the ethnic identity of the cardholder so the distribution strengthened
Belgian control over Rwanda and perpetuated the myth of Tutsi superiority. This
favouritism was largely appearance-driven and some Tutsi were given the best positions in
the colonial regime. This brought more prestige and self-confidence to the Tutsi than it did
to the Hutu.
Similarly Kimber (1996) argues that Belgium 'froze' the movement between groups by
instituting identity cards and increased the class identification by favouring Tutsi for
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powerful positions and easy access to power. As mentioned above, a series of measures
that transformed the social structure forced the majority of Hutu to remain poor. The new
identification by identity cards also led to the racialization of consciousness that affected
everybody.
Accordingly, Prunier highlights that even the insignificant Tutsi who did not benefit from -
the system in any way, started to believe they were indeed a superior race and that under
the same rags as their Hutu neighbours wore, a finer heart was beating. The Hutu, deprived
and exploited by both the White and a small group of Tutsi collaborators, began to hate all
Tutsi, even those who were just as poor as they (Prunier quoted in Kimber, 1996).
Among interviewees was a scholar and historian, Professor Faustin Rutembesa who is a
senior researcher in the Conflict Management Centre of the University of Rwanda. He
argued that 'ethnic mention' in identity cards was instrumental in the mediatization of
ethnicity that created a new 'conf1ictual space' of difference and othemess. Anderson
(cited by Varyrynen, 1996) shares the view that mediatic practices in ethnic politics create
an 'identity space' in which ethnic identification and the production of difference takes
place. In short, media counts among the social practices which shape ethnic identification
and produce parochial 'ethnicity subjects' (www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/vavrVIl.html).
In the case of Rwanda, 'ethnic cards' strengthened by structural changes introduced
important ethnic labels in everyday life.
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4.3.2.3. Forced labour as factor of Hutu identity consciousness
Almost all of the interviewees and the majority of the survey's respondents (63%: Table
5:2) accepted that forced labour contributed to reinforce the consciousness of Rutu
identity. As revealed in Table 5.7, people located in rural areas (82.7%) strongly agreed
with the view that forced labour acted as an important factor of ethnic consciousness
among Rutu group members. This reveals that this category of population was more
exposed to all fomls of exploitation and injustices than those living in urban areas.
Explaining his view about this issue, one informant stated:
... Belgians did not want to spend their money to develop the country
through paid labour. They said that Hutu were good to perform hard labour,
when generally their counterparts Tutsi were not concerned. Then people
worked without remuneration and those who refused to cany out this forced
labour were punished; even beaten. Forced labour was a hard and heavy
burden for people ... each citizen found that forced labour was very bad.
Table 4.8. Cross-tabulation of location and forced labour and other forms of
exploitation that raised the consciousness of Hutu identity
Forced labour and other Location Total
forms of exploitation
were a strong factor that Rural Urban
raised the consciousness
of Hutu identity
Agree 43 (82.7%) 27(39.7%) 70(58.3%)
Not sure 04 (7.6%) 26 (38.2%) 30 (25%)
Disagree
05 (9.7%) \5 (22. \5) 20(\6.7%)
Total 52( 100%) 68(100%) 120(\ 00%)
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The respondents gave many examples of activities, which were implemented:
• Building houses for administration and transporting building materials such as trees,
bricks and so on,
• Growing trees,
• Building and maintaining roads,
• Digging over-flow ditches.
According to OPRR, around 1930, those who were requested to perforn1 hard labour for
Government and to pay taxes were categorized as 'Adult healthy Male' (Homme Adulte
Valide: RA.V in French): young people and men who were strong (OPRR, 1996:21).
Forced labour is seen as important factor of division and hatred between Hutu and Tutsi.
For the most part, it was Tutsi 'chiefs of line' and 'town criers' I appointed by the colonial
authorities who supervised hard labour and the collection of taxes. The Belgians' laws
provided salaries for chiefs and chief-assistants, meaning that chiefs of line and town criers
were not remunerated. But this did not prevent them from carrying out their work with zeal
because they were still able to profit from it as people under their supervision, Ingabo went
to cultivate for them and gave them beer when they had got some (OPRR, 1996: 21).
Many respondents stated that 'chiefs of line' and 'town criers went beyond the limits of
their posts and gave themselves rights, which exceeded those set for them by the chief-
assistant. It is clear that the people were forced to remunerate them. These made people
feel resentment against them. Evidently this was another key element of consciousness of a
new identity developed by people who were marginalized, excluded and exploited.
Although ethnic tensions are not reported at that time, this was already a bad seed for the
I Chiefs, chief-assistants, chiefs of lines and town criers composed the hierarchy of indigene colonial
administration in Rwanda. The latest under supervision of chief-assistants and chiefs of line were charged to
check houses to make sure that every man has gone to work.
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future generations. The Belgians did not take any action or measures against that
exploitation as outlined by OPRR:
In the year of J927, the Resident of Rwanda devoted one day to Corvees (forced
labour) every seven days for each healthy young man and woman (H.A.v.).
What was required from a household before was now required from each
individual on his own; in such a way, Rwandan authorities during the colonial
period gained much new manpower to work for them without remuneration
(OPRR, 1996:22).
According to another infonnant, forced labour could not be enforced if there was not
punishment for those who refused to perfonn. Some of those punishments were harder than
others. Below is a quote from one of the interview respondents:
The first one is the flogging which was applied to many people. The low number
of floggings was light, and was applied to any person who had not well mulched
coffee plantations or who had not finished the field of cassava ... He laid down
naked on his belly and then was flogged eight times. This was called "remove
your clothes" (kurimpuzu), because people were ordered to remove clothes from
their buttocks, so that the flogging enters into the skin. The flogging made
people suffer, and made people who were using it and who ordered to use it feel
that they were superior, and those who were flogged feel that they were inferior.
Other punishments were fines, imprisonment and dismissal for chiefs and chief-assistants
who had not followed colonial instructions. Until now in Rwanda, comments about
colonial punislm1ents continue to provide an indelible basis of ethnic stereotypes that
targeted indistinctly all Tutsi and this situation strengthened the boundaries between both
ethnic groups. In this regard Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon (1995) argue that
cross-national research shows that cases of severe ethnic conflict share the following
characteristics:
• Institutionalised group boundaries and stereotypes,
• An experience of ethnic domination by one or more groups,
• The strong perception by one group that the opposing ethnic group has extemal
affiliations, and,
70
• Ethnically based parties with no significant interethnic coalitions.
Rwandan ethnic relations exhibited all of these characteristics in particular as the colonial
rule institutionalised Hutu and Tutsi boundaries.
(http://www.\ibrar)..utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/rwanda/rwanda2.htm).
4.3.2.4. Hamitic myth as factor of ethnicity
Seventy-six percent of the survey's respondents shared the view that the Hamitic myth
contributed to create and maintain division in Rwanda. Similarly, the majority of the
interviewees admitted that the Hamitic myth had negatively affected the relationship
between Hutu and Tutsi as a result of the Colonial Refom1 of Administration. Many
respondents declared that they did not know the origin of the words 'Hutu', 'Tutsi', and
'Twa'. Some respondents speculated that the meaning of Hutu was "umugaragu", meaning
servant. They also stated that Tutsi meant "gutunga", meaning to become rich, and that
Twa was connected to "Batwa", and related to groups of pygmies, most of them living in
the equatorial forest of Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC).
Even though there is no evidence of the origin of either of the terms, some people venture
to assert that Hutu and Tutsi are two different races, whose blood has nothing in common,
whose education is totally different. This notion was popularised since 1900 and still
exists.
Another infom1ant argued that the ideology of difference was introduced in a fom1 of
scientific research, namely the "Hamitic hypothesis". As one infonnant stated, despite a
long and peaceful coexistence among Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa which found them living
together, helping each other, socializing, and taking wives from either group and fighting
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together for their country, the Hamitic hypothesis considers Tutsi as superior and the other
groups as inferior. Now the majority of Tutsi think that Hutu and Twa are really inferior to
them and Hutu see Tutsi as arrogant people, colonisers with Hamitic origins in other
words, foreigners.
de Lacger (cited by Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1995) states that the greatest ham1 the
Belgian colonisers inflicted on the Rwandan nation was the introduction of the "Hamitic
myth", naming the Tutsis as being of Hamitic descent.
Supposed to be bom leaders and, in principle, had the right to a history and a
future almost as noble as that of Europeans [ ... ] before becoming black these
people were tanned. ·His stature resembles more closely that of a white person
rather than that of a Negro.
In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to state that he is a European who
happens to have a black skin.
(http://www.librar\..utoronto.ca/pes/eps/rwanda/rwanda2.htm).
To be sincere, in a restricted way some people 'can be morphologically classified Hutu or
Tutsi. But this physical variability cannot constitute a confirmation of Hamitic myth. In
Rwanda as in many other regions of the world there is simply a sense-making, which
means, according to Canfield (2003) the often hidden symbolic activity that accompanies
non-verbal communication (http://www.canitield.ltext/preface.htm).
This sense-making refers to how the Hutu define their Hutuness, Tutsi their Tutsiness and
Twa their Twaness. Their five senses provide them with information about the social world
they inhabit. Their bodies symbolise social interactions that create meanings, continually
identifying and labelling these bodies.
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Tutsi were described as a good race while Hutu and Twa were labelled as having an
inferior racial status. Obviously, these assumptions would have influenced them
consequently producing meanings of ethnic differences that affected their bodies.
To repeat the words of canfield (2003), people perceive themselves and others
symbolically, labelling their own bodies and the bodies of others. People hold
conversations with themselves, about themselves, about others and about events. In ShOli
there is a symbolic, cognitive activity involved in the presentation of self and in the
interpretation of the non-verbal behaviours of others (http://canfield.ltext/preface.htm)
The main sense of the Hamitic myth was that the Tutsi are a superior race. This increased
the frustration of Hutu. One respondent made it clear when showing the role of this
frustration among the Hutu in genocide of Tutsi in 1994. He argued that the Hutu elite felt
threatened by the massive retum of Tutsi in public affairs. Perhaps they felt something like
inferiority. Instead of competition with the Tutsi in a new Rwanda, unfortunately they
chose to annihilate them totally, hence the genocide.
The above statements are in some way illustrated by some fom1s of behaviour noticed
during the genocide. Hutu militiamen asked captured Tutsi ladies, to remove their clothes
in order to see what a naked Tutsi lady who was presumed to be more beautiful than Hutu
ladies, looked like. Barbu highlights such behaviours. He argues that human behaviour
derives from innumerable factors, including one's belief system and psychological needs,
such as a valuable social identity and self-esteem. As the same author continues, whether
the person is or is not aware of these factors, they shape his perceptual field. Moreover, his
behaviour and interaction with others is based on what he perceives as reality. The
meaning that the people attach to situations and events, are largely the consequence of their
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expenences, most of which transpire within political, economIC and social stmctures
(Barbu cited quoted in Baker, 1983 :89).
Evidently, the long economic and political marginalization of Hutu and their inferior status
officially declared through 'Hamitic myth' predisposed them to violent interactions with
Tutsi. As Barbu emphasizes, an individual is not simply a robot of socialization forces,
consequently the significance of structures in socializing and shaping the psychological
perceptions of individuals cannot be discounted. If individuals are deprived of economic
resources or means of livelihood, thereby making survival itself difficult, they are
behaviourally affected which in turn affects their interactions with others (Barbu, quoted in
Baker, 1983: 90).
If the attitudes of respondents through gender variable are examined, an imposing majority
of female respondents (87%: Table 5.8) is found who agreed that 'Hamitic myth' played a
cmcial role in the division ofHutu and Tutsi.
Table 4.9. Cross-tabulation of gender and Hamitic myth
Hamitic myth is one of GENDER Total
important factor that led
to ethnic division in Female Male
Rwanda
Agree 40 (87%) 51(69%) 91(76%)
Not sure 02 (04.3%) 20 (27%) 22( 18%)
Disagree
04 (08.7%) 03 (04%) 07(06%)
Total 46 (100%) 74(100%) 120 (100%)
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This reveals that Rwandan women are victims of this myth more than the men. Related to
this issue, women respondents stated that particularly Hutu girls or women who plan to
marry a man from the Tutsi group, face habitually strong opposition and even rejection
from the man's family. Similarly, they argued that a Tutsi girl, who wished to marry a man
from the Hutu ethnic group, faced opposition from her own family.
Many respondents regardless of gender (76%: Table 5.2) and other characteristics admitted
that after the genocide, Tutsi were very opposed to intermarriage between Tutsi and Hutu.
This attitude can be partially understood as a reaction due to atrocities endured by Tutsi
women during the genocide. In many cases atrocities were carried out by their own
husbands or they were killed by their own brothers- in- law from the Hutu group.
4.3.2.5 Attitudes of respondents regarding the role of the Catholic Church during the
Colonial Reform of Administration
During and after the Refonn, the Catholic Church in Rwanda remained very influential in
colonial administration, even in the creation of ethnicity. This is confim1ed by the survey's
results (66.7 % agreed). In addition our interview respondents agreed largely with this
opmlOn.
Many other researchers have found that the Catholic Church played a key role in the
institutionalisation of Tutsi supremacy. As Linden and Linden state, the Church backed the
Belgian policies of refonn. For example he states that Monsignor Classe, the top authority
of the Church in Rwanda had always believed that without Tutsi hegemony, the country
would dissolve into chaos. Particularly Monsignor Class saw missionary work as a way to
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create an ethnically defined Christian aristocracy composed of Tutsi (Linden and Linden,
1977:186).
The Church believed that if the Prince was converted, the people would follow. So the
Catholic Church focused on the conversion of the Tutsi elite. An informant described the
negative role of the Church in destruction of traditional institutions, particularly the
monarchy: " ... when Belgian missionaries arrived in Rwanda, they hoped that conversion of the
central court would be followed by the conversion of all Rwandans. At that time, they tried to
convert King Musinga who resisted because he considered himself as the symbol of the
continuation of the traditional religion, which was a key element of unity of Rwandans. His
intransigence against baptism, caused bishop Classe to plan his dismissal"
Des Forges confim1s this view. He states that because of the refusal of Musinga to bow to
colonial pressure, he was replaced on the throne with his son Rudahigwa who had been
educated by White Fathers. This was done with the full support of Monsignor Classe (Des
forges, 1969: 188).
One thing that disturbed unity among Rwandan youth is the school that was called 'Astrida
School' in Butare which was supervised by the Brothers of Charity and which opened its
doors in 1932. This secondary school was supervised by Monks and subsidised by the
government and in particular was aimed at preparing Belgians' assistants at the different
levels: doctors in medicine and veterinary surgeons, agronomists, secretaries and people
who would become chiefs in administration section (OPRR, 1996: 16). In other words, it
was a training ground for the next generation of elite in Rwanda. As the above source
continues, apart from the administration sections in which future chiefs were studying, all
other sections were mixed (Hutu and Tutsi). But from 1932 to 1959, Hutu were
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discriminated against even in the other sections. Registration of students each year showed
clearly the high proportion of Tutsi as opposed to Hutu pupils (Appendice 2).
In addition, as OPRR emphases all those who completed their studies in that school were
taken care of by the Belgian authorities and Brothers who had educated them so that they
kept being "elites" (indatwa), and became superior to other Rwandans.· When they
completed their studies, they were immediately given a job to work with white people.
They were offered accommodation in cities like Kigali and Astrida (now called Butare) ,
where they lived in special areas so that they could not mix with other Rwandans. (OPRR,
1996:17)
By the end of 1928 Bishop Classe had issued clear entrance guidelines for the school that
discriminated against Hutu (Newbury, 1988: 115). Linden and Linden emphasise that
Classe could hardly be accused of Hutu compassion when he explained to the Fathers in
1928: "they [Hutu] also need to be schooled and educated, and they will take up places in
mines workings and industry" (Linden and Linden, 1977: 164). The Catholic Church had an
important role to play on the social and political level, due to the fact that colonial
authorities respected it.
4.3.3. Factors of the Reform's implications on Hutu-Tutsi relationships
4.3.3.1. The culture of ethnic mobilization as a unique means of access to power
The survey's respondents (64.2%: Table 5.2) stated that the culture of ethnic mobilization
for political ends took place in Rwanda. Similarly the interview's respondents stressed this
culture as the central factor of violence in Rwanda since 1959.
One informant explains the problem this way:
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...The way Hutu were marginalized, is the same used by Hutu leaders to
discriminate politically against Tutsi [... ] whereas discrimination of Hutu
had been justified by the myth of Tutsi superiority [... ] Hutu leaders began
their political activities around independencies explicitly using the same
logic: defining Tutsi as the Hamitic minority oppressor of the Hutu people.
Another description from respondents reflects the same opinion: " ... the Rutu discontent
was reflected by a violent rhetoric of their leaders, already in 1958 Tutsi were qualified as
the minority oppressor without any mention of the white presence".
Many researchers stress the "Ramitization" of the rhetoric adopted by Rutu leaders during
the political struggle of 1950s: an amalgam, which did not denounce the role of colonizers
in the oppression of the Rutu. Visibly, exploiting a situation of injustice created by
themselves Belgians backed the new Rutu elite to eject Tutsi who began to express the
need for independence. Lemarchand (1988: Ill) explains it clearly:
Belgians did not merely shift their support away from the Tutsi monarchy to a
position of nominal neutrality but backed the Hutu outright, so that in the end,
it was the Europeans who guaranteed the undoing of a system they themselves
helped build ... the system would not be "undone" entirely, however, as the
events of the early 1960's would prove; it would be reversed. Past forms of
domination and oppression would continue to persist, only this time in Hutu
hands. The politics of polarised ethnic identity had earned its place in
Rwandan history".
During the 1950's Rut-Tutsi conflict was already open, following the line of colonisers and
even the Catholic Church transferred its support from Tutsi to Rutu elites. According to
Linden and Linden, the Rutu elite also benefited from their new ally in Church in the fonTI
of Flemish-speaking White Fathers who knew first hand the experience of being treated as
second-class citizens in their own country. The leading person in this new Catholic policy
was Bishop Perraudin who was of Swiss origin and argued that the Church's support in the
Rutu's cause was social justice (Linden and Linden 1977: 251).
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The significance of the historical projection of the Hamitic myth onto the cunent Hutu-
Tutsi problem continued to accelerate in the late 1950's with entrenched Hutu leaders, such
as Kayibanda and Gitera. In 1957, Kayibanda fom1ed the "Hutu Social Movement", to
promote the objectives articulated in the Hutu manifesto (Linden and Linden 1977: 251)
As Linden continues,
The significance of the Hutu Manifesto was not that it succeeded at arousing a
peasant revolt or stimulating class-consciousness; rather, its significance lay in its
definitions of the problem as one of "race". In framing the problem thusly, the
authors were able to resurrect the Hamitic hypothesis and speak the language of its
insupportable (i.e. irrefutable) logic. The purpose was not to debunk its racist
assumptions or move beyond its divisive precepts, but to interpret its meaning
from the other side, from the perspective of those it had oppressed with its
scientific claims.
As argued previously, for the Hutu leaders the foreign invader and Hutu oppressor was the
Tutsi, not the European colonizer. The Hutu-Tutsi cleavage was no longer one of class,
status or regionalism but represented the biological schism between Bantu and Hamites
(Linden and Linden 1977:258).
In a similar analysis, Newbury (1988: 193) argues that during this period, the tem1 "Tutsi"
became collectively and increasingly associated with oppression:
In his newly fonned newspaper, for example, Gitera extolled rural people "to
oppose their Tutsi oppressors, by force if necessary". Kayibanda's rhetoric
took on a strongly anti-Tutsi stance and stressed the need for "liberation" of
Hutu. In other words, where Gitera's appeal was class-based, Kayibanda's
was deliberately ethnic.
The transition from Tutsi to Hutu political domination was characterised by a continual
appeal for Hutu solidarity. Subsequently for the first time until then, the dichotomy of the
concepts "majority-minority" was introduced and exploited by Hutu leaders in their
struggle against the Tutsi. These political developments took the fom1 of anti-Tutsi
violence which began on 1st November 1959 and resulted in killing and exile of a huge
number ofTutsi.
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As Newbury (1988: 214) points out, the conclusion is that:
The salient fact was that virtually all those who controlled the state (before 1959) -
the chiefs and sub-chiefs- were Tutsi, and here is where the ethnic factor becomes
important [ ... ] an appeal to Hutu solidarity became, for Hutu leaders (backed by
the Catholic Church and Belgian colonialists), the most effective rallying point.
Although Hutu could and apparently did distinguish among Tutsi of different types
and attitudes, the fact that the chiefs and other African agents of the state were
seen as exploiters, and that virtually all of these were Tutsi, made an appeal to
ethnic solidarity potent where an appeal to "all poor people" may have been less
so.
4.3.3.2. Structural violence and cycle of violence
As clarified above, culture of violence is among the many negative consequences of the
Colonial RefoTI11 of Administration. The fact is pertinent as proved by the survey's
respondents (65.8%: Table 5.2) and interview's respondents who agreed that the culture of
violence took place in Rwanda since the implementation of RefoTI11 's policies that began in
fonns of structural violence against Hutu and became direct violence since November 1,
1959 and culminate in the genocide ofTutsi 1994.
One respondent argued that the culture of violence 111 Rwanda is the result of ethnic
ideology rooted in the colonial state perpetuated by native politicians in 1950s. He added
that ethnic segregation had brought about what one could call a virus in the Rwandan
society, which caused some Rwandans to seek the solution to their problems in the
extem1ination of their opponents.
Another respondent stated that due to the colonial policies based on ethnic discrimination,
Hutu and Tutsi developed ideas considering themselves as enemies and this was a factor of
destruction instead of one of building:
A Tutsi keeps considering himself as a Tutsi, and sees a Hutu as enemy;
and a Hutu sees himself as a Hutu first and perceives a Tutsi as an enemy,
while the Twa always sees himself as the dregs of society. Thus these
different ethnic components cannot have a common ideal, which would
help them to move forward together, and they could not detect a common
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enemy from abroad aiming to divide them or any fellow Rwandan who
could harm in a bid to satisfy his own needs.
Asked to establish responsibility for the massacres of 1959, many interviewees named the
Belgians first as being responsible for what happened. One respondent highlight it below:
... During the killings of ovember 1959 that Tutsi were victims, the Belgian
administration did nothing to stop them whereas it had the capacity to do so. On
the contrary they destroyed UNAR (National Rwandan Union), which was the
party of the King. For example on ovember 17, 1959, after consultation with
Bishop Perraudin and Kayibanda, Colonel Logiest, Commander-in-chief of the
Belgian and Congolese armed forces in Rwanda declared in clear words that we
must help order elements and fight against disorder elements, i.e. we must
collaborate with Hutu and combat Tutsi, because some will be obeyed by people
while others cannot.
As mentioned above, the main reason that caused Belgians to choose Hutu as their new
collaborators was motivated by the King and some Chiefs accused by Belgians and the
Catholic Church of giving priority to independence and being in collaboration with
socialist countries members of the United ations (UN).
Since 1956 Belgians and the Church had been seeking a way to evict the King. In fact,
King Mutara III Rudahigwa died (on July 25, 1959 in Bujumbura) in circumstances that
remain unclear. His death put an end to the administrative collaboration between Belgians
and Tutsi (OPRR, 1996:78). As had previously been the case, the Belgian choice of their
collaborators resulted in serious consequences for Rwanda's ethnic relationships. Their
choice for new collaborators and their integration into the new administration, due to the
end of colonialism, increased the misunderstanding and dissension among Rwandan ethnic.
The situation since the reform can only be summarised as structural violence against Hutu
and direct violence against Tutsi. Many researchers define the structural violence as a
situation of absence of war but still not peaceful. This concept legitimates the structural
violence that HalTis and Lewis (1999: 1) explain as follows:
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... John Galtung coined 'structural violence' as a result of fieldwork in
Rhodesia under British colonial rule. He became increasingly aware of the
limitation of defining peace as the absence of violence. He noted that while
there was little direct violence by the colonial authorities against the native
population, there were structures in society, which had significant negative
effects on the blacks.
Clearly structural violence is primarily understood as the absence of a means of living. Its
root meaning is lack of care, care in the sense of concern or anxiety about something.
Applied to the Hutu in Rwanda, as Harris notices, at a practical level, for those at the
periphery, structural violence can mean low wages, landlessness, illiteracy, poor health,
limited or no-existent political representation or legal rights and, in general, limited control
over much of their lives (Harris and Lewis, 1999: 30).
Summy states that the aims of society should be to strive to create the conditions where
every one's universal basic needs can be met, and to do this, one must engage in 'positive
peace'. It is through positive peace, directed at the realization of people's basic needs that
the cycle of violence is broken. Thus, structural violence is very harnlful and creates more
victims than direct violence during war (Summy, 1985:64).
Direct violence is an event, whereas structural violence is a slow process which achieves
its goals through exploitation, neglect and repression. Structural violence kills slowly by
comparison with direct violence but it kills many more (Harris and Lewis, 1999: 64). The
notions of positive peace and satisfying human needs are linked. Summy states that basic
needs are ontological, survival and universal. Their frustration is a sufficient explanation
for political and social instabilities (Summy, 1985:64).
At the interpersonal level, poverty, local inequalities, low self-esteem and, powerlessness
and sexism are important underlying causes of conflict. In light of the above, all conflicts
do share causes. The Rwandan conflict is dominated by questions about political exclusion
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and non-satisfaction of basic human needs by the use of identity criterion defined by
ethnicity. This is similar to the "participatory right" linked with "right to living means"
Table 4.10. Typology of needs and violence, which was working in Rwandan conflict
Needs Structural violence Direct violence
l.Survival Exploitation (reduce life span) Killing
2.Well-being (morbidity) Exploitation (Inequality) Maiming
3.Identity Penetration (look at life from Desocialisation (take culture
top dog point of view) away) resocialisation-secondary
segmentation (each party knows citizen
its area)
3.Freedom Marginalisation (everyone Torture, detention, expulsion
defined as secondary citizen)
fragmentation (parts have
freedom but are cut off from
each other and whole.
Source: Summy (1995)
4.3.3.3. Competitiveness: source of continual insecurity
The majority of the survey's respondents (71. 7%: Table 5.2) agreed that competitiveness
and fear of each other constitute the continual source of insecurity. Interview' respondents,
in their majority also shared this view. Educated respondents (75%: Table 5. 10) are
potentially more affected by insecurity when those (uneducated people: 54.2%, Table 5.9)
who ordinary don't have access to resources feel less affected by insecurity. This
imbalance explains why educated people are more involved In ethnic competition,
certainly, their educational level acts as means of competition.
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Table 4.11 Cross-tabulation of education level and level of competitiveness and
Insecurity
Ethnic competition is a Level of education Total
continual resource of
insecurity for both ethnic U~e.ducated Educated
groups
Agree 26 (54.2%) 54 (75%) 80 (66.7%)
Not sure 20(41.6%) 4 (5.6) 24 (20%)
02 (4.2%) 14 16 (13.3%)Disagree (19.4%)
Total 48 (100%) 72 120( I00%)
(100%)
Identity insecurity is a social psychological phenomenon that has been largely neglected in
conflict resolution. The colonial policy heightened Hutu resentment and, as discriminated
group, this led to insecurity of Hutu elite. Tutsi elite felt the same insecurity more keenly
when Belgians switched allegiances in 1959 and abruptly ended Tutsi dominance in
Rwanda. Meanwhile, Hutu elite established their mono-ethnic Party of the Hutu People
(PARMEHUTU), which established, with Belgian support, a government in Rwanda that
totally excluded Tutsi and Twa. In addition to this, attacks against Tutsi inside Rwanda
continued after independence in 1962.
The result was an increasing level of discontent Tutsi within the group, the majority of
whom had fled to refugee camps across the borders and since July 1962, Tutsi guelTilla
forces based neighbouring countries had conducted regular raids and incursions against the
new government. Without a doubt, the new evolution of events maintained a state of
mutual fear, insecurity and feeling of revenge on both sides that led to a cycle spiralling of
violence. As argued above, a conflict based on insecuritised identity and basic human
needs deprivation (Fisher et aI, 2000: 8), was alternatively working for both Hutu ethnic
groups and Tutsi.
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Many respondents stated that after the mysterious death of King Mutara III Rudahigwa, a
new King was elected, but with the new alliance of Belgians and Hutu leaders evicted the
new King Jean Baptiste Kigeri left the country in June 1960 when criminal acts were
directed against members of his new-formed party UNAR. Estimates showed that the
number of victims from November 1,1959 to the date of independence were between
10, 000 and 14, 000. After a short period of stability killings, began again in 1973 when
Tutsi began to be hunted down. According to OPRR, the reason was that Hutu leaders
were not happy that Tutsi were still occupying over 10% of economic and educational
positions reserved for them by the constitution. They used the example of Butare
establishment (the fonner Astrida School) where Tutsi in 1972 still represented around
40% of the student body and the University which also had 40% (OPRR, 1996: 78).
The marginalization of Tutsi continued until 1990's leading to new attacks by the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) that ended with the genocide of Tutsi in July 1994 that left
approximately one million victims.
In the light of above statements, undoubtedly the Hutu elite isolated the Tutsi as a method
of revenge but mainly they did it for the monopoly of control over the country resources.
The culture of monopoly as a legacy of the colonial regime showed that key-positions in
political institutions were very few and had to be monopolised and one's ethnic group was
seen as a guarantor of personal security. The same situation occurred before the genocide.
After the Arusha Peace Agreement I , the group of Hutu elite holders of power in 1994 felt
threatened by "Arusha Peace Agreement" that allowed the massive retum of Tutsi refugees
with among them highly educated people and hundreds of am1Y officers who had fled to
neighbouring countries, particularly to the Ugandan anny. Their definitive repatriation
I "Arusha peace agreement" refers to the final result of several phases of negotiations between the armed
movement RPF (Rwandese Patriotic Front) and the Government of Habyarimana who was killed when his
plane was shot on April 07,1994; giving rise to the start of the genocide.
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caused discomfort and started the idea of the genocide on Hutu elite side. On the other
hand, of the Tutsi, the emotional need for repatriation was irresistible and undisputable
after more than thirty years abroad in refugee camps.
During the interviews for this study, many uneducated and other similar categories
respondents located in Kigali Rural Province, emphasised the role of the elite in the
division and regretted their blind involvement in massacres of innocents whilst ignoring
the real motivations behind the mobilising speeches of politicians. Conversely, educated
respondents had a tendency to argue that what occuned was a result of injustices that took
place in society during the colonization or had the tendency to blame the elite from the
rival group.
In their analysis of the Rwandan conflict, Percival and Homer-Dixon (1995) highlight the
above opinion. They argue that insecurity and the scarcity of environmental resources,
created a context of violent ethnic mobilisation. This led to institutiona lised ethnic
boundaries, and these boundaries were defended by Hutu regimes. As Tutsi were the most
powerful ethnic group in pre-independence period, after independence ethnic identity was
one means that Hutu elites used assisted by their numerical majority, to establish and
maintain control over state institutions, including environmental resources such as
croplands. Because of scarce resources, the importance of access to power increased as
altemative economic options disappeared. Ethnic mobilization was the key to this access
threatened by Tutsi opponents (http://www.library.ca/pcs/eps/rwanda/rwanda2.htm)
The above authors highlight that in a context in which etlmic affiliation mattered, such as
in Rwanda, environmental scarcity created conditions that increased competition between
Hutu and Tutsi. As Percival and Homer-Dixon note from many comparative researches,
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severe cases of ethnic conflict share following characteristics that ethnic relations ID
Rwanda exhibited:
• Institutionalised group boundaries and stereotypes,
• An experience of ethnic domination by one or more groups,
• Strong perception by one group that the opposing ethnic group has extemal
affiliations, and
• Ethnically based parties with no significant ethnic coalitions.
(http://www.library.ca/psc/eps/rwanda2.htn1)
4.4. CONCLUSION
With findings and discussion of findings, this chapter has showed how the colonial state
exploited ethnic identities using unequal allocation of resources between different groups.
Reinforced by ideological ideas like the Hamitic myth, the above strategy produced its fruit
because the Belgians gained the full collaboration of the Tutsi, marginalising Hutu and
Twa. When they changed their allegiance from Tutsi to Hutu, the fom1er experienced in
tum discrimination accompanied by massacres and finally the genocide that increasingly





The question defining the concept of ethnic identity and conflict has been answered in the
second chapter, where identity is seen as a necessary prerequisite for social life. Effectively
the consciousness of ethnic belonging is progressively fom1ed and sharpened through
various fonns of social interaction, cultural symbols and codes, as well as through informal
and fom1al communication.
The common classification of ethnic groups includes elements such as culture, religion,
territory and race features. However, some aspects of ethnicity have shown that the above
features are not always the only criteria. This led researchers to assume that ethnic identity
refers to how a group describes itself as a distinct ethnic group, no matter how artificially
the group is organised or how much the group believes in its sameness and distinctiveness.
After definition, in the same chapter, the concept of ethnic identity has been examined in
its conflicting aspects principally regarded as a source of competitiveness when people see
themselves as belonging together and decide on the pursuit of political interests,
encouraging ethnic identification and ethnic boundaries.
In trying to understand the conflict in Rwanda though the manipUlation of identities by the
Colonial Refom1 of Administration, what appeared clear is that before the Colonial Refom1
88
of Administration there was a situation of diversity and fluid identities among the clans of
Rwanda and this played a key role as a unifying factor.
Sharing the same culture and belonging to same clans, this situation presented a solid space
of solidarity between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. As proved by many researchers ( ewbury,
1988; Linden and Linden 1977), for the most, the names Tutsi, Hutu and Twa
corresponded to occupational categories limited by many regional identities that restricted
their usage to a particular area of the country, notably Central Rwanda, so that many
people would feel prouder of their regional and clan identities than their economic status.
Unfortunately, the involvement of colonisers through the Reform modified the traditional
structure implying change of meaning of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities. The previous
economic stratum became ethnic stratum. Consequently, clan became meaningless and
even progressively forgotten, whilst the new, colonial labels took more importance.
The factors used by colonisers during the Reform to mobilise particularly Hutu, Tutsi and
Twa identities have been discussed in Chapter Four. The results and discussions about this
point have been counter checked with previous results obtained by other researchers. The
questionnaire (Table 4.2) was answered as the researcher collected 120 questionnaires out
of a total 145. To make findings generalisable, they were substantiated with unstructured
interviews that were conducted with ten people.
Based on the findings and discussions of the findings, all the objectives that were set by the
researcher for this study have been accomplished. Clearly the Colonial Reform of
Administration entrenched and ethnicised Hutu, Tutsi and Twa social identities. Thus, an
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assessment of the factors of ethnic mobilization as discussed in the previous discussions
brings to light the following conclusive points:
Ethnicity in Rwanda is a typical social creation and not a fact of nature. Conventional ..
distinction between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as ethnic groups based on racial characteristics,
territory distinctiveness, and cultural difference cannot satisfactorily work. However,
sometimes although to limited degree, Rwandans are able to distinguish or to classify
themselves as Tutsi or Hutu according to physical features. It is perhaps not sufficient to
use the Hamitic hypothesis about the origin of Tutsi as a reason for ethnic division and_
killings. Different ethnic groups which have coexisted and interacted for several decades
are able to make such physical distinctions between, for example, a Muluba of Kassai
(DRC) and a Mukusu ofKindu (DRC).
If one assumes that ethnicity in Rwanda is a typical social creations, at the same time it is
assumed that this required the involvement of outsiders. To a greater extent the Belgians
divided Rwandans into racial categories. As proved by findings of this study and other
research, the root-cause of Hutu-Tutsi conflict was based on actions and policies
established by the state. The ethnic criteria in allocation of resources between Hutu, Tutsi
and Twa appear to have been the most important factor of division and ethnic
conSCiOusness.
During the Colonial Reform of Administration, Belgians were the real holders of power in
Rwanda. They previously promoted the Tutsi group but in 1950's they shifted their support
from Tutsi to Hutu domination. They backed Hutu leaders who exploited the ideology of
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the Hamitic myth in the sense of a campaign against the Tutsi who were defined as
Hamitic or foreigners.
Division in Rwanda appeared to have both a rational and an emotional attaclU11ent due to
the combination of ideological aspects and calculation about resources. The rationality is
justified by the use of ethnicity as instrumental and expressive of survival needs. However,
the emotional aspect became predominant despite the gains to be made by acting in a non-
ethnic way. People in Rwanda chose to continue to act ethnically. This is illustrated by the
genocide perpetrated after the signing Arusha Peace Agreement that suggested many
convenient solutions to the Rwandan conflict.
The action of the Belgians was largely strengthened by the involvement of the Catholic
Church. The involvement of the Catholic Church contributed to the conflict as a social
factor expressed in terms of the education provided to the Tutsi elite. However, the
education given to Rwandans was very limited. For example the famous school of chiefs
and their sons, 'Nyanza School', that existed from 1919 to 1935 was categorised as a
primary school. Those who studied in this school had an important role to play in
goveming Rwanda under the supervision of Belgians. In reality the educational level of
those of graduate did not allow them to understand the future consequences of their
collaboration with the Belgian colonisers. King Musinga who tried to resist against such
collaboration was isolated, dismissed and finally banned.
However, if the Belgian action led to creation of division in Rwanda, their action is the
root-cause of ethnicity in Rwanda. At independence and in later years, native leaders chose
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to support and, even worse, they emphasised ethnic ideology and ethnic policy as means of
full control of power.
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
The elite seek the control of power as a way of economIC and political security.
Subsequently, there is a need for a convenient means of access to power that can replace
the culture of access to power through ethnic violence, one which can give security to Hutu
and Tutsi as the main rival groups. Democracy would be the most appropriate course of
action in this case, but it needs to have a constitutional framework that considers local
realities and particularly the rights of minorities. In other words, the constitution in its
democratic consideration would have to provide some dispositions aimed at protecting
minorities that is the Tutsi and Twa, against marginalization by the dominant Hutu group.
Competition between Hutu and Tutsi has resulted in more and more marginalization of the
Twa group due to the fact that it represents almost insignificant minority (I % of the total
population). This has had another negative consequence for Hutu and Tutsi relations: there
is a continual polarization due to the absence of a real multi-ethnic society that can reduce
the level of rivalry between Hutu and Tutsi. If Rwandan society had more than three ethnic
groups, tension and violence between Hutu and Tutsi would not be at the present high
levels. In the light of above, this study recommends ultimately the integration and the
empowem1ent through an appropriate positive action of Twa, as a third Rwandan ethnic
group, in all institutions of the country. In the particular case of democracy the results of
this study revealed that the Twa group is still marginalised and totally misrepresented in all
national institutions. Consequently this study would recommend:
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maintained by a continual sensibilization of the whole population in order to secure them
in the reconciliation process. The final outcome of this policy should be the predominance
of the national identity over ethnic identities.
At the ethical level, the government needs to develop a code of conduct through which the
governing class would be judged in tern1S of ethnicity and any political behaviour contrary
to the policy of reconciliation. A national policy that fights against corruption at all levels
of state's institutions needs to be set up.
At the cultural level, slackening of the Rwandan culture is among the root causes of
misfortunes that Rwanda has experienced in the past and still suffering today. There are
many concrete elements in the Rwandan culture that can be rebuilt to recover national
unity. In this regard, elements that this study recommends are for example social
interaction, solidarity, courtesy, patience, patriotism, customs and rights.
At the religious level, churches in Rwanda should make their contribution to the
reconciliation of Rwandans through their social policies, which would unify instead of
favour or segregate people by ethnic considerations. They should also avoid referring to
ethnic matters in various actions and communications with people as it happened
regrettably during previous regimes and particularly during the genocide.
94
REFERENCES
Anderson, B. Imagined communities. 2nd edition, London: Verso, 1991.
Appiah, K.A. 'Identity, authenticity, survival: multicultural societies and social
reproduction', in Amy Gutman (ed) multiculturalism. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1994.
Babie, E., and Mouton, 1. The practice ofsocial research (South African ed.), Cape Town:
Oxford University Press, 2002.
Bailey R. D. Methods ofsocial research. ew York: Free Press, 1978.
Baker, D. Race, ethnicity alld power. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983.
Banton, M. Racial alld ethnic competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Bart, F. (ed.) Ethnic groups and boundaries, the social organization ofculture difference.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969.
Bauman, Z. 'Soil, blood and identity' The Sociological review, 40(4): 675-701,1991.
Beall, Jo (ed). Valuing difference and working with diversity. In JoBeall (ed.) A City for
All: Valuing difference and working with diversity. London: Zed, 1997.
Bernard, H. R. Research methods in anthropology: qualitative and quantitative
approaches. 2nd edition. Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press, 1994.
Bhaskar, R. The possibility ofnaturalism. Hassoks: Harvester, 1979.
Billington, R., Hockey, 1., and Strawbridge, S. 'Exploring self and society'. ew York:
Palgrave, 1998.
Black, T. R. Doing quantitative research in social sciences. an integrated approach to
research design. measurement and statistics. California: Sage Publications, 1999.
Bloom, L. The social psychology ofrace relations. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd,
1971.
Bloom, L. Identity and ethnic relations ill Africa. Brookfield: Ashgate, 1988.
Bowen, 1. The myth of global ethnic conflict. Journal ofDemocracy 7: 4 (October): 3:14,
1996.
Bruce , S. The edge ofunion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Campbell, C. M. Identity and gender in a changing society: The social identity of South
African Township youth. Ph.D. thesis: University of Bristol. 1992.
95
Campbell, c., Mare G., and Walker C. Evidence for an ethnic identity in the life stories of
Zulu-speaking Durban township residents'. Journal for Southern African Studies, 21 (2),
1995.
Cooper, D. R, and Schindler, P.S. Business research methods. New York: Mc Graw Hill,
2001.
Cora, G. and Venneulen, H. (eds.) The politics of ethnic consciousness. New York: St.
Martin's Press, Inc, 1997.
De Vos G. and Romanucci-Ross L. Ethnic identity. California: Manifield Publishing
Compagny, 1975.
Des Forges, A The ideology of genocide. Issue: A journal of Opinion XXIII: 2, 44-47,
1995.
Des Forges, A Leave none to tell the history: Genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human
1999.
Des Forges, A. Defeat is only bad news: Rwanda under Musinga (1896-1931). PhD
Dissertation. Yale University, Ann Arbor, Michigan University Microfilm International.
1972,
Des Forges, A, Kings without crowns: The white Fathers in Rwanda, In Eastern African
history, Ed. Daniel F., Mc Call, onnan R., Benneth, and Jeffrey Butler, 176-207. New
York: Praeger.
Enloe, C. Ethnic conflict and political development. Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1973.
Ericksen, T. Ethnicity and nationalism: anthropological perspectives. London: Pluto Press,
2002.
Fisher, RJ. Interactive conflict resolution. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997.
Fisher, S., Ludin, 1., Ibrahim, D. I. Williams, S., Smith, R, and Williams, S. Working with
conflict. New York: Zed books, 2000.
Frank, 1. 'The Face of the enemy'. Psychology Today 2, no. 6: 24-29, 1968.
Frederick of Mecklenburg, A. A land of giants and pygmies. In The National geographic
magazine Volume XXIII, no 4 (April), 1912.
Fried, C. Minorities: community and identity. New York: Springer- Verlag, 1983.
Frueh, 1. Political Identity and social change: The remaking ofSouth African Social Order.
New York: State University of New York, 2003.
Guiberneau, M. and Rex, 1. The ethnicity, nationationalism, multicuralism and migration.
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997.
96
Harris, G., and Lewis, Structural violence, positive peace and peacebuilding. In Geoff
Harris (ed.), Recovery from armed conflict in developing countries. London: Rout1edge,
29-36,1999.
He1en, C. Power in Ruanda, Anthropologica. 4: 1,45-85, 1962.
He1en, C. The biography of an African society, Rwanda 1900-1960. Tervuren-Be1gium:
Musee L'Afrique Centra1e, 1973.,
He1en, F. Genocide: a sociological perspective, London: Sage Publications, 1993.
Hertefelt, M. D. Clans in ancient Rwanda, ethnosociology and ethnohystory elements,
Tervuren-Be1gium: Tervuren, 1971.
Horowitz, D. Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley and LA: University of Califonia Press,
1985.
James, W. 'Reinforcing ethnic boundaries: South Africa in the 1980s'. In Competitive
ethnic relations. Edicted Suzan Olzac and Joane Nagel, London: Academic Press, 1986.
Jefremovas, V. Contested identities: power and the frictions of ethnicity, ethnography and
history in Rwanda. Anthropologica, 39: 91-104,1997.
Jenkins, R. Social identity. London: Routledge, 1996.
Jenkins, R. Rethinking ethnicity, arguments and explorations. London: Sage Publications,
1997.
Jones, B. D. Peacemaking in Rwanda. The dynamic offailure. London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2001..
Kagame, A. Un abrege de l 'ethno-histoire du Rwanda. Butare : Editions Univestaires du
Rwanda, 1972.
Kanyamacumbi P. Society, culture and political power in Interlake dwelling Africa. Hutu
and Tutsi in the old Rwanda. Kinshasa: Select, 1995.
Kimber, C. Coming to terms with barbarism in Rwanda and Burundi. London:
Intemational Socialism, 1996.
Laclau, E. Introduction. In E. Laclau (ed.). The Making ofpolitical identities, New York:
Verso, pp. 1-10, 1994.
Laclau, E. 'Universalism, particularism, and the question of Identity'. In E. Wilmsen and
P. Mac Allister (ed) The politic ofdifference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 45-58,
1996.
Lauren, P. G. Power and prejudice: the politics and diplomacy of racial discrimination.
Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988.
97
Lemarchand, R. Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which genocide? Whose genocide? African
Studies Review 41: 1 (April): 3-16, 1988.
Lemarchand, R. Political clientelism and ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing
solidarities in nation-building. American political science review 66: 1 (March)
68-90, 1995.
Leonard, P. Personality and ideology: toward a materialistic understanding of the
individual. London: Sage, 1984.
Levin (ed) Ethnic identity, legitimising ideologies and social status: A matter of
ideological asymmetry. Political psychologica, 18,373-404,1988.
Linden, 1., and Linden 1. Church and Revolution in Rwanda. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1977.
Louis, W. R. Ruanda-Urundi 1884-1919. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.
Mamdani, M. From conquest to consent as the basis of state fomlation, Reflections of
Rwanda. ew Left Review 216 (March-April) 3-36, 1996.
Mamdani, M. When victims become killers, Colonialism, Nativisl11, alld the Genocide in
Rwanda. ew Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Maquet, 1. The Premise of inequality in Rwanda. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
Maquet, J. Rwanda castes, In Social stratification in Africa. Alihur Tuden and Leonard
Plotnicov (ed.), ew York: The Free Press, 1970.
Mare, G. and Hamilton, G. An appetite for power: Buthelezi's Illkatha and South Africa.
Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987.
Mare, G. Brothers Born of Warrior blood: Politics and ethnicity in South Africa.
Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992.
Mare, G. Ethnicity and politics in South Africa. London: zed Books, 1993.
Marx, A. Lesson ofstruggle. New York: Oxford Press, 1992.
Nage1, J. Political construction of ethnicity in competitive ethnic relations. Orlando:
Academic Press, 1986.
Newbury, C. Ethnicity in Rwanda: the case of Kinyaga. Africa 48: 1, 17-29, 1978.
Newbury C. The cohesion ofoppression. Clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
Newbury, C. Ecology and the politics of genocide: Rwanda 1994. Cultural Survival.
(Quarterly): 22: 4, (Winter): 32-35, 1999.
Newbury, D. Kings and clans. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991
98
Newbury, C. Background to genocide: Rwanda, Issue: ajournal of Opinion XXIII: 2, 12-
17, 1995.
Newbury, C. Ethnicity and the politics of history in Rwanda. Africa Today 45: 1 (January-
March): 7-25,1998.
Office of the President of the Republic of Rwanda. The unity of Rwandans, before the
colonial period. under the colonial rule, and the first Republic. Kigali: OPRR, 1996.
Oliga, J. C. Power, ideology, and control. New York: Plenum Press, 1996.
Ouho, L. The relationship between migration and poverty in southern Africa. Pretoria:
SAMP, 2002.
Pamphile S. The creation of ethnic division in Rwanda. In the courier, ACP-EU, no 168,
March-April, 86-87, 2000.
Patton, M. Q. Qualitative research and evaluation Methods. London: Sage Publications,
2001.
Prunier, G. The Rwanda crisis: HistOlY of genocide. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995.
Reimer, D.V. Le Rwanda vu a travers le portrait biographique de I 'ofjicier, explorateur
De I 'AFique et Gouverneur Imperial Gustav Ado!! Cote Von Gotzen. Berlin: Dietrich
Reimer Verlag, 1992.
Reintjens, F. Power and law in Rwanda, public law and political evolution 1916-1973.
Tervuren-Belgium: Tervuren, 1985.
Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. Discourse and discrimination, rhetoric of racism and anti-
semitism. New York: Routledge, 2001.
Rennie, J.K. The precolonial kingdom of Rwanda: a reinterpretation. Transafrican Journal
ofHistory 2:2,11-53 (1972).
Reyntjens, F. Rwanda: genocide and beyond, journal of Refugees studies 9; 3, 240-51,
1996.
Rodrigues N.T. Believing identity. New York: Berg, 1997.
Roosens, E. Creating ethnic identity: the process ofethogenesis. London: Sage, 1989.
Rummel, R. J. Genocide in totalitarian states, mortacracies and megamurderers. In 1. W.
Chamy, Widening circle ofgenocide. (Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review 3, pp. 7-
9), New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994.
99
Ruterana lM.V. Butare School (1929-1962), Dissertation for a degree 111 History,
Ruhengeri: NUR, 1987.
Rwigamba, B. Course of ethics and Rwandan culture. Kigali: Kigali Independent
University (ULK), 2003.
Sanders, E.R. The Hamitic hypothesis: its ong111s and functions 111 time perspective.
Journal ofAfrican History, 10;4, 521-32,1969.
Seleti, Y. The Transition to democracy and the production of a new national identity in
Mozambique. In Critical arts, a journal ofcultural studies, Vol. 11 (1 &2), 1997.
Shibuthani, T. and Kwan, K. Ethnic stratification: A Comparative approahc. New York:
Collier-Mac Millan Limited, 1965.
Shklar, 1. Thefaces of injustice. London: Yale University Press, 1990.
Staub, E. The roots of evil: The origins ofgenocide and other group violence. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Staub, E. Breaking the cycle of genocidal violence: healing and reconciliation. In 1. Harvey
(ed), Perspectives on loss: a sourcebook (231-241), Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis,
1998.
Staub, E. The origins and prevention of genocide and mass killing. Peace and Conflict:
Journal ofPeace Psychology, 5 (4),303-336,1999.
Staub, E. genocide and mass killing: Origins, prevention, healing, and reconciliation.
Political Psychology, 21 (2),336-383,2000.
Summy, R. Typology of non-violent politics. The Australian journal ofpolitic and history,
18(2),230-258,1985.
Tajfel, H. Human groups and social categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981.
Tajfel, H. (ed) Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982.
Taylor, R. 'The myth of ethnic division: township conflict on the reef'. Race and class 33,
n02, 2-10, 1991.
Turner, 1. and Brown, R. Social status, cognitive alternatives and intergroup relations. In
H. Tajfel (ed.). Differentiation between social groups. London: Academic Press. 1978.
Vansina, 1. Evolution of the kingdom ofRwanda from origin to 1900. Brussels: Ademie
Royale des sciences d 'Outre-Mer, 1962.
Vansina, 1. The politics of history and cnSlS 111 the Great Lakes. Aji-ica Today 45: 1
(January-March): 37-44, 1998.
100
Webster, D., Abafazi bafihlakala: ethnicity and gender in a Kwazulu border community. In
AD Spiegel and PA Mc Allister (eds), tradition and transition in South Africa,
Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1991.
Walker, C. Nation is a nation, is a state, in an ethnic group, is a ... Ethnic and racial studies,
I: October, Toronto: Mac Millan, 1978.
Yeros, P. Ethnicity and nationalism in Africa, Constructivist Reflections and
Contemporary Politics. ew York: Macmillan Press LTD, 1999.
Wallman, S. Ethnicity at work, London: Mac Millan Press LTD, 1879.
Young, C. Patterns of social conflict: state, class and ethnicity. Daedalus11 1: 2 (Spring):
71-78, 1982.
Young, C. The temple of ethnicity. World Politics 35:4 (July): 652-62,1983.
WEB SITES




Fujii, L. (2001). http://www.isanet.org/archivc/fujiihtml, accessed 2003-10-13
Hayes M. (1991). http://www.community-relations.org.uk/progs/cd/whither.htm. accessed
August 09-2003
Martin, 1998, http://www.law.emorv.Edu/EILR/volumes/faI198/martin.html. accessed
October 05, 2003
Percival and Homer-Dixon, (1995).
(http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/Rwanda/rwanda2.htlll), accessed October 13, 2003
Vayryren, T. (1996). http://w'vvw.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/varyryn.html, accessed October
19,2003
http://.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata.html , accessed October 15 2003,
101
http://wwVv·.com/private/philophers/bookstone:shotml. accessed August 10-203
http://www.russian-matia.de/untermenues/Fun/Zilate/]eaniaques%20Rousseau.html.
accessed August 10-2003




This survey is being carried out to determine the perceptions that Rwandans have ofHutu and
Tutsi identities their implication in conflict in Rwanda.
It will contribute towards research being carried out for a dissertation in the Masters of
Conflict Resolution and Peace studies offered by the Faculty of Human Sciences, University
of Natal
SECTION A: IDENTIFICATION OF CORRESPONDENT
(Mark with x your appropriate answer)






2. What is your age?
Younger than 60 years: ..
Older than 60 years .
3. What is your location?
Urban: .
Rural: .
4. What is your gender?
Woman: .
Man: .
SECTION B: INFORMATION RELATING TO THE CASE STUDY
(Mark with x your appropriate answer)
1. Before the colonial Reform Tutsi, Hutu and Twa referred to economic positions/ Mbere
y'uko Ababirigi basenya inzego z'ubutegetsi za kinyarwanda, Umuhutu, Umutunzi




2. Before the Colonial Reform clan was the most important and unifying identity / Mbere
y'uko Ababirigi bahindura inzeko z'ubuyobozi za gakondo, amako yarangaga yo mu Rwanda
nk' Abazigaba, Abasindi n'ayandi yahuzaga Abanyarwanda kuko Abahutu, Abatutsi
n' Abatwa babaga bayasangiye:
Agree/ yego
Not sure / sinzi
Disagree/ oya
3 Before the Colonial Reform, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa participated equally in political




4. The Reform generated privileges for some Tutsi and discrimination against Hutu and Twa
creating a violent division/ Imiyoborere ya gikoroni yatonesheje Abatutsi bake, iheza Abahutu





5. Ethnic mention in identity cards contributed to the development of ethnic beliefs/




6. Forced labour imposed to Hutu during the Reform raised strongly consciousness of Hutu
identity/ Gukoresha cyane Abahutu imirimo ivunannye mu gihe cy' Ababirigi byabateye




Hamitic myth reinforced division between Hutu and Tutsi/ Kumvikanisha ko Abatutsi




8. The Catholic Church played a crucial role in ethnic division in Rwanda/ Kiliziya Gaturika




9 The Rwandan elites used ethnicity as unique means ofaccess to power / Abize nabo bunze





10. Ethnic competition became a continual source of insecurity for all ethnic groups/




1I. The Reform resulted in structural violence and finally lead to a cycle of violence /




12. Illiteracy and poverty facilitated ethnic manipulation during the Colonial reform/ Ubujiji




13 Reduction of povel1y can be used as means of peacekeeping /Kurwanya no kugabanya
ubukene mu Rwanda biri mubyashyigikira amahoro:
4
Agree/ yego
Not sure / sinzi
Disagree/oya
14. Democracy, justice and education for peace can help reconciliation / Demokarasi,




IS. National identity and clanic solidarity can reinforce the unity and reconciliation/ Gushyira




16. The integration of the Twa in socio-political institutions can reduce ethnic rivalry in






Appendix 2: Distribution of candidates to Astrida School and ethnic group (1932-162)
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APPENDIX 3: MAP OF RWANDA (Source: www.ictr.org/maprwanda.html)
Rwanda's countryside is covered by grasslands and small farms extending over rolling hills, with
areas of rugged mountains that extend southeast from a chain of volcanoes in the northwest. The
divide between the Congo and Nile drainage systems extends from north to south through western
Rwanda at an average elevation of almost 9,000 feet. On the western slopes of this ridgeline, the
land slopes abruptly toward Lake Kivu and the Ruzizi River valley, which form the western boundary
with the People's Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) and constitute part of the Great Rift
valley. The eastern slopes are more moderate, with rolling hills extending across central uplands at
gradually reducing altitudes, to the plains, swamps, and lakes of the eastern border region.
Although located only two degrees south of the Equator, Rwanda's high elevation makes the climate
temperate. The average daily temperature near Lake Kivu, at an altitude of 4,800 feet (1,463
meters) is 73°F (23°e). During the two rainy seasons (February-May and September-December),
heavy downpours occur almost daily, alternating with sunny weather. Annual rainfall averages 80
centimeters (31 in.) but is generally heavier in the western and northwestern mountains than in the
eastern savannas.
Location: Central Africa, east of Democratic Republic of the Congo






Area - comparative: slightly smaller than Maryland
Land boundaries:
total: 893 km
border countries: Burundi 290 km, Democratic Republic of the Congo 217 km, Tanzania 217 km,
Uganda 169 km
Coastline: 0 km (landlocked)
